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TRADE ADMINISTRATION
*

Kathleen Claussen

At the core ofpublic debates about trade policy making in the United
States and the so-called "trade war" is a controversy over who should
be responsiblefor making U.S. trade law: Congress or the President.
What these importantconversationsmiss is that underlyingmuch of our
trade policy in recent decades is a widespread executive-branchlawmaking apparatus with monitoring, rulemaking, adjudicative, and
enforcementfeatures that operates in considerableshadow. Executive
branch agencies are now the primary actors in trade lawmaking. This
Article excavates that critical underbelly: what I call our "trade
administrativestate." It maps the trade administrativestate's statutory
and institutional ascent, which I maintain was the product of
considerable experimentation in governance schemes developed in
response to diverging market trends and normative priorities, the
absence ofjudicialmechanisms to monitor its borders, anda deficiency
of administrativelaw disciplines to respond to itsfortification.
This unearthing reveals that the trade administrative state does not
operate like the rest of the regulatorystate either inform or in process,
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despite that its actors engage in several conventional regulatory
functions. Rather, trade lawmaking is predominantly managed by a
single agency, the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
and, procedurally, it lacks the hallmarks traditionallyassociatedwith
administrative law. The Article then evaluates this model in light of
administrative law's aspirations. It demonstrates how our present
model of trade administrationand its self-policingcontrol mechanisms
clash with commonly held scholarly and doctrinal understandingsof
executive governance.
This assessment of modern trade governance also prescribes certain
lessons for how administrative law operates when it comes to certain
specialized areas of administration. Surprisingly, despite the fact that
trade administration challenges established positivist and processorientedvalues, it does so in such a way that may enhance compliance
with internationallaw. At a moment when critics raise concern about
the President'sdisfavor of internationaltrade law and institutions, this
study reveals that certain norms may be entrenched in our trade
administrativestate to counteract those concerns.
Taken together, the Article makes three contributions:First, it identifies
and illustrates the experimental history of trade administration.
Second, I unpack the distinctfeatures of trade lawmaking as managed
by executive branch agencies and draw conclusions about itsfunctions
for the way we conceive of trade actors and trade action in our
constitutionalframework.Finally, the Article analyzes the implications
of this revealed structurefor administrative law both in process and in
content and shows how trade law serves as an unexpected
administrativeconstraint.
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INTRODUCTION

Legal debates over allocations of power in trade lawmaking have
focused on the shift in power from Congress to the President.1 But beneath
the surface of our separation of trade law powers is a vast tradelawmaking administrative apparatus with understudied implications. It is

the executive branch beyond the President that wields considerable

control over trade law outcomes and policy actions. The true driving

forces of U.S. trade lawmaking are sited inside the executive and are often
out of sight. This Article seeks to precipitate a turn away from thinking
about the imposition of congressional controls in trade lawmaking in

favor of greater consideration for administrativecontrols. I argue that the
modern trade-lawmaking process is not one shaped by the separation of
powers as much as it is by agency administration.

This study considers the work of what I call the "trade administrative
state"2-and with some urgency. As recent events have brought the

See, e.g., Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107

Calif. L. Rev. 583, 586-97 (2019); Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43

Yale J. Int'l L. 315, 316-20 (2018) [hereinafter Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers];
John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers under the United

States Constitution, 13 Dick. J. Int'l L. 203, 204-05 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh,
Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1191, 1191-92 (1986).

2 As I explain further below, the "trade administrative state" refers to a
vast landscape of
executive branch agencies that write trade rules, monitor the implementation
of those rules,
adjudicate disputes over their content, and subsequently enforce them in three dimensionshorizontal, vertical, and diagonal. See Subsection II.A.1.
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3
features of our trade administration once again to the fore, commentators

have argued for better balance between the President and Congress as a

means of correction. 4 While those assessments underscore important
conversations about the democratic separation of powers generally, they
tend to discount the normative and practical entrenchment of trade
5
lawmaking among executive branch agencies. The delegations from
Congress to the President are just the tip of the iceberg with respect to our
trade topography. U.S. trade lawmaking is embedded in a much larger
administrative structure-parts of which are hidden from Congress,
despite its constitutional primacy, and from even the White House. But

the story is not just one of structure. Administration is also largely about
process. Executive agencies play the most important role in trade
lawmaking, and they do so according to sui generis processes subject to
little supervision.

This Article provides a thorough descriptive review of modern U.S.
trade administration and then evaluates whether our form of trade
administration is appropriate or preferred. In so doing, one key feature

s See, e.g., Josh Zumbrun, Feliz Solomon & Jeffrey Lewis, U.S.-China Trade War Reshaped
Global Commerce, Wall St. J. (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/artices/u-s-china-trade-

Ana
[https://perma.cc/CGZ2-3CGX];
war-reshaped-global-commerce-11581244201
N.Y.
Lingers,
Damage
War
Trade
as
Slumps
Manufacturing
U.S.
Swanson & Jeanna Smialek,
Times (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/business/manufacturng-trump-

trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/3ZC2-2BT9]; Shawn Donnan, Trade Won't Fade as a Big
Disrupter in 2020, Bloomberg (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-01-02/trade-war-latest-trump-2020-china-tariffs-election-polls

[https://perma.cc/7ZQW-FXCZ].
4 See, e.g., Philip Wallach, James Wallner & Clark Packard, Is Congress Willing To Assert
Responsibility for Trade?, Bulwark (Feb. 3, 2020), https://thebulwark.com/is-congresswilling-to-assert-responsibility-for-trade/ [https://perma.cc/254H-AL5M]; Daniel Griswold,

Only Congress Can End the China Trade War Quagmire, Hill (Sept.

11, 2019),

https://thehill.com/opinion/interational/460920-only-congress-can-end-the-china-trade-war-

quagmire [https://perma.ccID2WK-QQJM]; Jennifer A. Hillman, How To Stop 9Trump's
Trade War Madness, N.Y. Times (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201 /08/11/opinion/trump-china-trade.html [https://perma.cc/N4XX-583F]; Clark Packard, Congress
Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs, Foreign Pol'y (May 4, 2019) [hereinafter
Tariffs],
Over
Authority
Its
Back
Take
Should
Congress
Packard,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/04/congress-should-take-back-its-authority-over-tariffstrump/ [https://perma.cc/BME2-XV9C].

s To be sure, a considerable literature on the political economy of trade policy has identified
this important shift. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, U.S. Trade Policy in Historical Perspective,
6-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26,256, 2019) (referring to additional
work in the field). Legal scholarship relating to domestic trade institutions, on the other hand,
has been more limited, especially in recent years. This Article builds off the foundation of the
former to build a conversation in the latter.
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surfaces: the managerial role played by a single agency created in 1962
called the Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"). 6
Today, USTR supervises most of our modern trade-lawmaking enterprise,
acting as a super-agency similar to the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB").] USTR oversees other agency rulemaking and, strikingly, can
compel action from other parts of the government.
It was not always this way. The present arrangement is only the latest
iteration in a history of experimental trade governance. At the nation's
founding, the regulation of foreign commerce consisted primarily of the
issuance of tariff schedules and the negotiation of commercial treaties. 8
Congress relied on the President to adjust tariffs in respect of carefully

circumscribed situations and counted on the Bureau of Customs to apply
the tariff rates on goods at the border.9 These activities involved little
discretion by the executive branch. A progressively aggressive delegation
of authorities to the President and a movement toward reciprocal
arrangements with trading partner countries empowered the executive

branch to take on greater authority from the 1890s through the 1930s.10
By the middle of the twentieth century, trade lawmaking had become an
exercise of an extensive legal machinery-not just in content but also in
institutional form. While Congress continued to guide its substance, the

diminished congressional role eventually heralded a new mode of
governance with distinct features that have since characterized the way

U.S. trade law is made.
This Article presents the details of this structural change. It
demonstrates how the trade administrative state today is deeply

entrenched and remarkably complex. To practice in this area is to develop
a niche specialization in a distinctive administrative universe. Thus, one
purpose of this Article is to review the undervalued legal system of
foreign trade regulation: to chronicle the statutory and institutional rise of
6Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 101 et seq., 76 Stat. 872 (codified
as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).
7 See Eloise Pasachoff, The President's Budget as a Source of Agency Policy
Control, 125
Yale L.J. 2182, 2194-99 (2016) (describing the role of OMB); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin
M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239, 1243 (2017) (discussing the
OMB's super-styled role without using the term); see also David C. Vladeck, O.M.B.: A

Dangerous Superagency, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/
1 9 8 9 /0 9 /0 6 /opinion/omb-a-dangerous-superagency.html
[https://perma.cc/9PVV-XYFM]
(warning that OMB "exercises cradle-to-grave control over all regulatory initiatives").
8See

infra Section I.A.
9 Id.
10 See infra Section I.C.
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this multifarious system and to situate it empirically at the core of modern
trade law.
This functional appraisal illuminates another layer of trade
administration: its characteristic administrative law traits-or rather, the
lack of administrative disciplines that apply. At first glance, one might
think the positive story of trade lawmaking just mirrors that of either
regular administrative lawmaking or of foreign affairs lawmaking. Some
observers may see this as a sort of extension of the work of the OMB."
But in ways unlike other areas of executive branch lawmaking, tradelawmaking agencies are sites of administrative innovation. They make
law not through the standard administrative law playbook but regularly
rework it from the ground up. Only some features of trade lawmaking are

12
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). A great deal of

trade agency action is not subject to either conventional notice-and13 In many trade-related
comment procedures or judicial review.
congressional delegations to agencies, the form and content of
administrative process, if any is specified, is left to the agency's
discretion. These notable omissions raise questions both for
administrative law's reach as well as for trade law's accountability,
transparency, and legitimacy. The result is a form of administrative
governance that is characterized more by experimentation and
haphazardness than by accountability and rule-of-law values.
Most surprising about this account is that USTR intervenes in the

domestic rulemaking process where it finds that rules proposed by other
agencies are not compliant with international trade law. Thus, one
overlooked feature of the trade administrative state is that it has elements
that both reject administrative law features and inject international law
raise
primacy into the administrative process. At a moment when critics

concern about the future of international trade law and institutions, this
study reveals that certain norms are entrenched in our trade administrative
state to counteract those concerns.
" OIRA

Pages,

The

White

House,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-

regulatory-affairs/ [https://perma.cc/5G4J-SYYV] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); see also Nestor
M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence-at OIRA and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259, 268as a
70 (2015) (examining Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") practice
form of executive lawmaking).
of
12 See 5 U.S.C. §@ 500-04, 551-59, 561-84, 591-96, 701-06. I return to the question

whether trade falls within the APA's foreign-affairs exception infra at note 219 and
accompanying text.
13

See infra Section III.A.
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The stakes of trade administration have only continued to grow.
Congress has delegated vast authorities of different types to these

agencies such that the choice between a "free trade" policy or a more
"protectionist" policy is left almost entirely to the executive.14 Take, for
example, the Trump administration's so-called "trade war." Under the
current model, the process for imposing tariffs on products is an
administrative

process.

Agencies

carry

out investigations,

make

determinations, and either act on the President's direction or provide their
findings to the President for his ultimate decision. Those agencies also
implement the tariffs and adjudicate which products and industries will
be exempted from those tariffs. Critically, and unexpectedly, the trade war
has illustrated that when these agencies engage in trade lawmaking, they
are subject to a different set of rules and regulations and processes than
many agencies that act exclusively domestically.15 Our recent extensive
tariff exercise has helped bring to light this discrepancy in practice and

may provide a guide to how stakeholders can advocate for change or an
end to the warring tariffs. Thus, shifting the lens of our focus to trade
administrationhelps us to deconstruct the trade war and contextualize it
within broader notions of regulatory authority.

The study's descriptive content motivates its positive and normative
conclusions. From a policy perspective, modern trade administration has
both benefits and drawbacks. The costs of trade administration-such as
its lack of transparency and democratic inputs-may be outweighed by

its international-law-enhancing functions. But the costs and benefits are
not mutually exclusive. The absence of traditional administrative law
mandates may provide necessary expertise, flexibility, and compliance

with international law, but they can also be abused in the way that
administrative law's proponents have feared. This dilemma raises the
question whether it is possible to create a principled approach to trade

lawmaking that fosters compliance and coherence, but that also addresses

4 For an overview of the delegations made by Congress to the executive with respect to
both free trade and protectionism, see generally Kathleen Claussen, Trade's Security
Exceptionalism, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 1097, 1109-26 (2020) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade's
Security Exceptionalism].
5 This is not to suggest that all domestic agencies subscribe to a singular process, but rather
to capture how the typical agency controls are not as salient as they would be in the traditional
domestic administrative law textbook depiction.

[Vol. 107:845

VirginiaLaw Review

852

the fundamental participatory and democratic principles that
administrative law endorses.1 6
I argue that a different way forward is possible, even if handicapped by
a certain degree of path dependence and entrenchment, and that more

ought to be done to consider administrative principles in trade law. We

can strengthen administrative law values in trade law without losing the
important coordinating and rule-enforcing features of the present system.
When done well, an administrative law approach to trade could lessen the
pressure on congressional-executive politics and take advantage of
agency expertise while also creating an opportunity for administrative

review. Judicial review is an important check on agency rulemaking that
could be enhanced without considerable overhaul of the present system.
Administrative law structures can hold agencies accountable for
providing

appropriate

justifications

and

abiding

by

statutory

requirements.
Finally, a critical examination of trade administration is of pressing
importance as Congress, courts, and legal scholars debate new forms of
trade governance and institutional frameworks for trade law and
lawmaking.' 7 This evaluation allows policy makers to assess the practical
this question is one with which the political economy literature has wrestled, but
which legal scholarship has not confronted in detail in some time. The picture of trade
administration has evolved since those prior accounts as discussed further below. See infra
Section II.A.
" See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App'x 982, 990-91 (Fed. Cir.
2020); Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1281-83 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2019); Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1272-76 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2019); Rep. DelBene Introduces Bill To Prohibit the Use of IEEPA To Impose
Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (June 28, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/rep-delbeneRep.
[https://perma.cc/TU7F-8CPT];
introduces-bill-prohibit-use-ieepa-impose-tariffs
Murphy Introduces Bill To Give Congress a Say in National Security Tariffs, Inside U.S.
Trade (June 25, 2019), https:/insidetrade.com/trade/rep-murphy-introduces-bill-givecongress-say-national-security-tariffs [https://perma.cc/UB69-KWG7]; GOP Bill Would
Require Congressional Approval of IEEPA Declarations, Inside U.S. Trade (June 20, 2019),
https://insidetrade.com/trade/gop-bill-would-require-congressional-approval-ieepadeclarations [https://perma.cc/7YFK-663U]; Isabelle Hoagland, Sens. Lankford, Coons
Divided on USMCA Timing, United on Need for Tariff Legislation, Inside U.S. Trade (June
13, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/sens-lankford-coons-divided-usmca-timingunited-need-tariff-legislation [https://perma.cc/BC79-KDJH]; New Kaine-Carper Bill Would
Give Congress Broader Trade Authorities, Influence, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://insidetrade.com/trade/new-kaine-carper-bill-would-give-congress-broader-tradeauthorities-influence [https://perma.cc/XFV2-AAD2]; Lawmakers Introduce Bill To Delay
Potential Auto Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 14, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/dailynews/lawmakers-introduce-bill-delay-potential-auto-tariffs [https://perma.cc/XF6P-QG2Z].
6 Again,
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operation and costs and benefits of changing or abandoning the existing
model, which may be especially important in periods of political
transition.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the anterior three
eras of trade-lawmaking governance in historical perspective and

theorizes the foundations of the trade administrative state. It analyzes the
evolution both structurally and functionally by identifying key statutes
and institutional moves made by all three branches. As this Part

demonstrates, a confluence of factors led to the increased responsibility
for a variety of agencies in trade lawmaking.
Part II introduces the idea of modern trade administration and maps out
major institutional design choices. The bulk of this Part presents newly

gathered legislative and executive materials to establish the breadth of
agency and sub-agency involvement in trade lawmaking and its
hierarchical, expansive, and multifaceted structure of today's foreign
commercial regulatory framework. I document the ways in which the
executive branch trade apparatus has flourished to the point of making

USTR a manager, rather than an agent as is traditionally believed, when
it comes to U.S. trade law. This Part captures the hallmarks of managerial
trade administration that set USTR apart from other agencies. Taken

individually, each of USTR's many roles is not especially noteworthy, but

taken together, they make USTR distinctive in under-explored ways.
Part III turns to normative issues, analyzing doctrinal, practical, and

policy benefits and drawbacks. I argue that this managerial model

exacerbates concerns about interest group capture in some ways by
removing such engagements from judicial review and the public eye. But
it also has the unexpected benefit of enhancing U.S. commitments to

international trade law. Thus, on the one hand, such an approach to trade
governance improves U.S. adherence to international law and streamlines
a considerable array of cross-border economic policy, but, on the other, it
does so at the expense of traditional positivist and process-oriented
values.
Finally, Part IV considers lessons for why the trade administrative state

and its legal limits matter for ongoing structural and doctrinal debates. I
refer to this as trade law's "unfinished business."
Two caveats are in order. First, this Article tries to capture the most

important pieces of trade lawmaking. There are some areas where the
managerial model has less salience, but the Article seeks to confront why
and how that fragmentation in trade governance surfaced. Second, given
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its breadth and opacity, no single essay could fully canvass trade
administration. I intend to set out a preliminary review and to note areas
that cannot be addressed in this space.
I. ANTERIOR TRADE FIDUCIARIES

This is not the first article to identify executive branch prominence in
trade lawmaking.18 Scholars tell the story with varying degrees of
concern,19 questioning the legitimacy of the President's decision making

on trade policy and attributing it to different internal and external factors.
this
Few, however, have scrutinized the nature and content of
multilayered work of the executive or the consequences for and influences

on multiple areas of law that it implicates. In fact, U.S. trade law is the

and
product of a complicated contest among governing bodies
international
constituencies: the U.S. Congress and the executive branch,
institutions and domestic agencies, and interest groups and technocracies,
association
to name a few. The Constitution does not dictate a specific
20 Because of the
trade.
on
between the branches or these other actors
complexities of the issues and the dynamism of different narratives and

evolving politics, no single entity has gained plenary control. The result
has been an evolving relationship among these many actors-one that can

be traced across different eras of governance characterized by their
noteworthy and distinct features.
This Part presents a structural periodization of trade administration. It
lays out as an historical taxonomy the eras that have informed the
modes
governance configuration of trade lawmaking today. Four distinct 2
' Each
present.
the
have shaped trade lawmaking from the earliest days to

is defined not just by the relationship between the branches during those

" See, e.g., Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 597-612 (discussing how delegations
the Freeshifted authority from Congress to the President); Jide O. Nzelibe, The Illusion of
Trade Constitution, 19 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 2-3 (2016); Koh, supra note 1, at
1192-93 ("[T]he President has historically asserted dominance over international trade .... ").
& Sitaraman,
19 Compare Nzelibe, supra note 18, at 8 ("legislative altruism"), with Meyer
("abdication").
supra note 1, at 609
American Trade Politics 33
20 To be sure, some would say it does. See, e.g., I.M. Destler,
empowered
constitutionally
only
the
is
Congress
that
fact
(4th ed. 2005). They point to the
has
branch. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But those same scholars do not deny that Congress
32.
the opportunity to delegate its authority as necessary. Destler, supra note 20, at
21

Cf. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 586-612 (describing only two paradigms). My

analysis does not take issue with the two paradigms that Meyer and Sitaraman set out; rather,
structural
it intends to complement that important project and take up the explicit and implicit

modes within those governing paradigms.
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years as identified in legislative delegations or judicial pronouncements,
but also by the extensions and applications of the executive that changed
the texture of trade law over time. The transition to each new period turns
on rules and patterns of practice developed in response to specific

contingent events. What emerges from this view is that the developments
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries laid the foundation for a
robust trade administrative state. Further, while the periodization is based
on identifying changing centers of power in trade lawmaking, it also
identifies how pressures in the regulatory state to develop processes that
provide checks and balances on the actors governing the regulatory space
did not obtain as a priority in trade. The result is a system with few top-

down controls from Congress and few bottom-up checks through
administrative processes by private actors.
Last, while this story is largely situated in an executive-legislative give-

and-take responding to international politics and markets, this is not
meant to suggest that there is no role for the judiciary. The impact of the

courts ebbs and flows at different points in the story. For reasons I will
explain, courts have been noticeably absent in serving as a control for the

growth of the trade administrative state due to statutory constraints on
their intervention. I highlight some relevant judicial interventions in this
Part, but I leave a comprehensive review of the scope of trade law's
domestic adjudication for another day. Such a contemporary study is
badly needed but goes beyond the focus of this project. For now, this Part
provides a typology of the features, both statutory and institutional, in

each governance model, why they emerged, and the trade-offs of applying
any one of them.
A. Partnership

Although the Constitution assigns tariffs and the regulation of foreign

commerce to Congress,2 2 in the earliest days the actual application and
development of foreign commercial relationships was very much a

partnership between the two branches with both executive agencies and
the President engaged in supportive roles. 23 Congress immediately
22 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
3.
23 See Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views
of International Trade in the
Constitutional Order, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1495, 1516 (2016) (referring to authorizations made to

Washington, Adams, and Jefferson to embargo ships). At that time and for many years trade
was related to war. The United States fought wars over trade and fought wars through trade.

Trade was inextricably linked to the existence of the nation. Id. at 1517.
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following its creation established a list of tariffs and instituted an
24
executive infrastructure to apply them. The fifth Act of Congress created

the federal Customs Service and tasked it with collecting tariffs at ports
25
of entry, but legislators quickly added other responsibilities as well.
Within a matter of weeks, Congress also assigned to the Customs Service
the design, construction, staffing, and management of lighthouses in each
customs district. 26 Shortly thereafter, customs collectors took on a range
of administrative tasks, serving as the front-line actors on the border.
Among their responsibilities were the use and implementation of ten ships

27
("cutters") to police U.S. waters in relation to customs revenue, as well
28
as the enforcement of quarantine and state health laws, and collecting

29
hospital duties from marine hospitals. By September 1789, Congress

created the Department of the Treasury responsible for all matters
30
pertaining to the collection and protection of revenue. Administration of
customs laws was placed under the Treasury Secretary at the
Department's creation.

From the beginning of the Republic, the executive branch also

negotiated Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCN") treaties with
1
other countries regularly.3 Those treaties, negotiated by the State

Department, gave special tariff privileges to the treaty partner. They

guaranteed most-favored-nation treatment to certain goods entering the

32
United States from that country. Through these treaties, the executive

together with the Senate enacted rules about foreign commerce that would
be executed by the Customs Bureau. Likewise, Congress would issue
In July 1789, the second Act of Congress established a system of tariffs on imported
"goods and merchandises" while the third Act established tariffs on the tonnage of ships.
24

Already in Congress' earliest days, there was a debate about the proper objectives of a tariff,
but most salient was the need for revenue. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24; Act of July

20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27.
25 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
26 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53.
27 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 62-64, 1 Stat. 145.
28 Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474.
29 Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605.
" Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
31 John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era,
51 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 302, 307 (2013). Although these FCN treaties were popular into
the twentieth century, their impact on foreign commerce diminished. In fact, most FCN treaty

provisions were incorporated into other areas of U.S. law. Id. at 341-43 (describing the ways
the treaty provisions "fade[d] into near-irrelevance").

See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of Prussia, and
the United States of America, Prussia-U.S., art. 4, Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84.
32
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ordinary tariff schedules and the Customs Bureau would execute by
collecting the applicable tariffs on products at the border. Neither branch
of government had a clear monopoly as both worked to create alliances
and revenue for the newly independent United States. As with other
aspects of the constitutional transition, many of the foreign economic

policies had to adjust from individual U.S. states' administrative
machineries to a national, federal system.
The nation's early decades were not without controversy as to
executive authority in foreign affairs generally.33 These arguments tended

to favor increased presidential power, but, in trade, given that tariffs were
at the heart of the policy, there was bi-branch engagement in policy
making and partnership in execution.
B. Trusteeship

By the early nineteenth century, change was already underway in the
mode of trade administration. In addition to the continued implementation
of tariff rates and other customs regulations as well as the negotiation of
FCN treaties, Congress began to delegate certain authorities to the

President in which it entrusted him with a fiduciary role over trade
lawmaking. For these particular authorities, the President was the

principal executive branch actor, rather than the State Department,

Treasury, or Customs Bureau. His discretion was limited, however, such
that he could act only when national interest required his intercession. The
President effectively served as the nation's trustee with respect to trade
law and trade lawmaking.

Relying on the President to make these determinations was not the only
way Congress enhanced its tariff-setting authority during this period. It
also institutionalized an independent support system. This Section begins
with the delegations that evolved during what I call the trusteeship era
before turning to these structural innovations.
1. One-Way Delegations

As early as the 1790s and going forward, foreign commercial problems
arose in practice, if not in law. Those problems, which included attacks
on U.S. commercial vessels and complications with European and

3 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 Va. L.

Rev. 987, 1013-14 (2013).
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Caribbean trading partners,3 4 demanded more flexible solutions in the
regulation of our foreign commercial policy than Congress could provide.
Although the branches still worked together in various capacities on trade
matters, the legislation of the period reflects a congressional view that

real-time decisions were needed and Congress was not well-positioned to

make such decisions, particularly in light of the nuances of our foreign
policy in which they were really very entwined.
On at least four separate occasions before 1810, Congress granted the
President the authority to adjust under specific circumstances trade
35
policies that Congress enacted. Those circumstances almost always
involved the invocation of public or national need or interest. That is,
Congress relied on the President to determine where national needs
demanded adjustments. Congress repeatedly granted the President the
power to amend, specially apply, or even reverse some commercial rule
36
where the President found it to be in the "interest of the United States"
37 in
it"
require
should
safety]
[or
interest
public
the
or "if in his judgment
1794, 1799, 1806, and 1808.38 The concept was pervasive in these
delegations throughout the period: Congress treated the President as a
guardian of the public interest in trade matters.

Under his trustee-styled delegations, the President had the discretion to
start and stop certain trade practices, to provide access, to instruct

executive branch officials to act on these authorities, and eventually to
raise and lower tariffs on certain products and on products from certain
3 See, e.g., Message Transmitting a Report of the Secretary of State on the Spoliations
Committed on the Commerce of the United States (Mar. 5, 1794), in 1 American State Papers:

Foreign Relations 423, 423-24 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833)

(describing with concern the attacks on U.S. merchants and the need for greater authority to

combat such attacks).
" Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799,
820-29 (1995) ("Early statutes imposed this duty on the President, typically requiring him to
issue a proclamation giving each complying country a clean bill of health. We call these
proclamation statutes,' and they have been very common.").

Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613.
Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, § 3, 2 Stat. 411.
on
38 Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 (authorizing the President to lay an embargo
ch.
1799,
9,
Feb.
of
Act
require");
so
ships as necessary "whenever . .. the public safety shall
2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613 (making it lawful for the President to draw back restrictions on trade that
Congress enacted "if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United
36

37

States" or "whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United States shall require"); Act of

Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1,

§ 3, 2 Stat. 411; Act of April 22, 1808, ch. 52, 2 Stat. 490 (authorizing

the President to suspend a trade embargo for certain vessels "on such bond and security being
given as the public interest . .. require").
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countries. Where tweaks were needed, the Legislature entrusted the
President with the ability to undertake those small changes. This practice
would continue for more than one hundred years, even as the language
would change in small ways. Take, for example, an Act of March 3, 1815,

which dealt with the repeal of duties on goods, wares, and merchandise
imported into the United States to be applied "whenever the
President .. . shall be satisfied that the discriminatingor countervailing
duties of such foreign nation, so far as they operate to the disadvantage
of the United States, have been abolished."39 Congress used the President

as a fact finder in these small ways, relying on the President's judgment
as to when or upon whom these changes in policy should apply. 40 In none
of these did Congress install a backstop that would allow it to assess
readily the President's exercise of his discretion, but the contours of his

decision making were substantially circumscribed.
Nearly identical delegations are found in Acts from 1817, 1824, 1828,

1830, and 1884.41 Some acts from this period also delegated similar
authority to high-ranking executive officials.4 2 One legacy of the
trusteeship era is the maintenance of these trustee-style constructions in
our modem trade law, allowing the President to act, often in the form of

tariff modifications, under confined circumstances where he makes a
delineated factual finding.4 3
In 1889, conversations began in earnest about giving the President

enhanced authority beyond the principled discretion he had in the trustee-

39 Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224 (emphasis
added).

40 For a more robust discussion of the President's tariff-related
fact-finding in the context of

fact-finding more generally, see Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 Vand. L. Rev.

825, 849 (2019).
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 39, 3 Stat. 361-62; Act of Jan. 7, 1824,
ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 2; Act
of May 24, 1828, ch 111, § 1, 4 Stat. 308; Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 2, 4 Stat. 425; Act
of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 14, 23 Stat. 53.
42 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, 14 Stat. 3 (allowing suspension of the
prohibition
"whenever the Secretary of the Treasury shall officially determine" that importation of certain
cattle would not spread infectious disease).

4 See S. Rep. No. 73-871, at 1-2 (1934) ("The committee has inserted the words
'as a fact'

following the words in subsection (a) 'the President, whenever he finds.' This is to make clear
that Congress under the proposed bill is establishing a policy and directing the Executive to
act in accordance with the congressional policy only when he fmds as a fact that existing duties
or other import restrictions are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United
States. In the same provision, to the words 'existing duties or other import restrictions' the
words 'of the United States or any foreign country' have been added to clarify the meaning.").
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styled delegations.44 Attention turned away from tariff adjustments to the
45

prospect of negotiating reciprocal tariff reductions with trading partners.
To allow the President to negotiate tariff reductions in wide swaths would
be a change that would eventually mean the President had an enhanced

role more as an agent of Congress on trade lawmaking rather than a

trustee. But the road away from trusteeship toward agency was not so
direct or smooth.
The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 maintained a trustee-styled
46
delegation just with wider boundaries. It allowed the President not just
to start or stop some trade action, but also to remove individually listed
products from various tariff classifications and apply different duties. The
statute empowered the President to act where he believed that a country
exporting certain goods was imposing duties that appeared reciprocally
unequal. 47 Members of Congress and business actors questioned the

breadth of this executive action, although the U.S. courts in a landmark
case upheld these shifts and their exercise. In Field v. Clark, the Supreme
Court concluded that permitting the President to engage in negotiations

with trading partners for reciprocal tariff adjustments through a
congressional delegation was appropriate because Congress may

"delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the law makes, or intends to make, [Congress's] action depend. To deny
48
this would be to stop the wheels of government." Notwithstanding the

44 See Alfred E. Eckes, Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776,
at 70-74 (1995).

41 Id. (noting that Secretary of State Blaine revives the idea and urges President Harrison to
request authority).
46

Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.

47 Section 3 of the Act provided that certain commodities would be admitted free of duties,

but that the President could impose specified rates against nations charging "unequal and
unreasonable" duties on U.S. commodities. Id. § 3; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,68091 (1892) (holding that Section 3 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and
treaty-making authority to the President); Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A
History of U.S. Trade Policy 304 (2017) [hereinafter Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce]; H.R.
Rep. No. 73-1000, at 9 (1934) (recognizing the President's power under Section 3 and noting
the Field decision); Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39
Colum. L. Rev. 751, 761-62 (1939) (discussing presidential action in protectionist trade policy
generally); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 Yale L.J. 140, 173-74 (2009) (noting this started a transformation in U.S.
international lawmaking).

143 U.S. at 694; see also id. at 699-700 (Lamar, J., dissenting) (commenting that this Act
ought to be distinguished as it is clearly lawmaking). Interestingly, and somewhat ironically,
the Court has developed major principles of administrative law through trade-related cases
48
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Court's stamp of approval, Congress terminated this executive trade

authority in 1894 as the politics on tariffs changed. 49
Three years later, Congress again reversed course and over the next 25
years would progressively grant the President greater authority, 0
especially at the requests of Presidents Taft and Harding. 5' For example,

the Paine-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 "authorized the President to
ascertain those countries [that] did not 'unduly discriminate' against
American commerce and [that] accorded to the United States 'reciprocal
and equivalent' treatment and to declare by proclamation that the
minimum rates should be applicable to all articles imported into the
United States from such countries." 52 Under this authority, presidents
issued 134 proclamations "including practically the entire commercial
world." 53 The 1909 Act also empowered the President to appoint trade

advisors as he deemed necessary.

4

Despite these calls and changes empowering the President in various

ways, the common position continued to be that Congress was responsible
for trade through the early decades of the twentieth century. 5 Up until
such as Field and others taken up below. In the twenty-first century, trade-related
administrative law has been significantly curtailed.

49 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 71, 28 Stat. 509,
569; see also Harold U.
Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917, 59-60 (1977) (discussing the politics of

tariffs in the years after the Wilson-Gorman Act); Eckes, supra note 44, at 70 & 70 n.39
(discussing congressional opposition to executive reciprocity agreements in 1884).
5 The Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 authorized the President again to negotiate
reciprocal
tariff agreements with an eye to lowering tariffs with trading partners. Dingley Tariff Act of
1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203. The 1922 Fordney McCumber Tariff Act again
empowered the President to adjust tariff rates under the condition that the Tariff Commission

so advised. Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941-46.

51 In President Taft's inauguration in 1909, he called for Congress to give him still greater
authority, but also noted that any such action was a congressional prerogative. William

Howard Taft, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1909), in 1 Presidential Addresses and State Papers
of William Howard Taft: From March 4, 1909 to March 4, 1910, at 53, 55 (1910) ("It is
imperatively necessary, therefore, that a tariff bill be drawn ... and as promptly passed as due
consideration will permit. . . . I venture this as a suggestion only, for the course to be taken by
Congress, upon the call of the Executive, is wholly within its discretion."). Warren G.
Harding,
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921), in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United

States: From George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989 237, 243-44 (1989).
52 H.R. Rep. No. 73-1000, at 10 (1934).
5 Id.
4 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 2, 36 Stat. 11, 82-83.
5 See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints
65 (6th ed. 2009) ("Prior to the 1930 act, tariff changes were viewed as entirely the domain of
Congress."); see also Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly
Known As Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name
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that point, these limited delegations were exactly that: limited, and often
within the confines of controlled principles such as "in the national
interest" or to avoid "undue discrimination." And they were seen as
necessary for the practical undertakings of execution of the congressional

legislative authority. 56 Soon, however, the delegations would hand over
so much authority to the President that he began to be seen as Congress'
agent on trade, rather than a trustee.
2. InstitutionalFoundations

A second noteworthy feature of the trusteeship era was that it laid the
groundwork for the present day through its preliminary steps toward

institutionalization and the creation of modern trade administrative state.
Most important was its 1916 establishment of a permanent and
independent Tariff Commission-today the International Trade
57
Commission ("ITC" or "the Commission"). Prior to the creation of the
Commission, in most instances, Congress relied on facts supplied to its
58
committees by interested parties. But with the establishment of a

Change, 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 1, 6 (2003) ("Prior to the twentieth century U.S.
");
regulation of foreign commerce was almost exclusively a congressional prerogative ....

Ian F. Fergusson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the
Role of Congress in Trade Policy 2-3 (2015). ("For roughly the first 150 years of the United
States, Congress exercised its authority over foreign trade by setting tariff rates on all imported
products.").
which
56 As the Supreme Court confirmed in Field v. Clark- "There are many things upon
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power,

and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
5 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795.
58

On several different occasions since 1865, tariff boards were set up by Congress or in

some instances by executive order for specific studies, but none would be permanent. For
example, a tariff commission was established in 1882 with nine members. It was appointed to
report to Congress on recommended tariff rate changes. Report of the Tariff Commission,
H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 47-6, pt. 1., at 1, 5, 7 (1882). Upon doing so, it ceased to function. The
Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy, 80 Yale
L.J. 1418, 1424 n.31 (1971); Act of May 15, 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-145, ch. 145, 22 Stat. 64;
see also U.S. Tariff Comm'n, The Tariff and Its History 97-100 (1934) (describing nine nonpermanent bodies created between 1865 and 1922 to study tariff-related issues). Likewise, in
1911, a three-member Tariff Board was established pursuant to congressional funding thereof
to look into the tariff schedule for wool and woolens. Act of Mar. 4, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61525, ch. 285, 36 Stat. 1363. Other non-permanent agencies were created in 1865, 1866, 1888,
1909, and 1912. See generally J. Bernhardt, The Tariff Commission: Its History, Activities
and Organization 3-14 (1922) (providing an overview of the activities of seven government
bodies tasked with studying tariff-related issues between 1865 and 1912).
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permanent Commission, Congress had steady support on increasingly

complex and technical matters related to tariffs.
The Tariff Commission also had a role in emphasizing and supporting
the President as trade trustee. In its early years, Congress tasked the Tariff
Commission with collecting information and reporting to Congress to
inform its tariff decisions. By the early twentieth century, Congress'
inability to adjust tariff rates in a timely way generated growing concern.

William Smith Culbertson, President of the Tariff Commission, argued
that this problem could be addressed if Congress allowed the President
with the guidance of experts at the Tariff Commission to adjust import

duties as economic conditions demanded. 59 Likewise, among the Tariff
Commission's early recommendations was an endorsement of giving the
President greater authority to negotiate and secure the reciprocal lowering
of tariff barriers in the public interest. 60

Apart from the trusteeship role of the President, Congress also
delegated a handful of similarly structured investigative tasks to other
executive branch actors. For example, the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921

allowed the Treasury Secretary to administer and impose duties in
accordance with the results of his investigation. 6 1 The Treasury Secretary

rarely used this authority, unlike in the case of the authorities delegated
to the President. 62 Another institutional development was the creation of
consular offices on behalf of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
("USDA"). 63 These offices in foreign countries were intended to obtain
seeds and plants for analysis by USDA to advise Customs on various
imported items.
This was the first specialization in an otherwise

domestic department to contribute to trade-lawmaking activities.
Taken together, these institutional moves primarily provided a support
system for the work of Congress, while, as trustee, the President had

independent authority to make decisions according to his best judgment,
59 Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 356-57.
60

Id. at 356-57, 362-64.

61 Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, ch. 14, § 201-202, 42 Stat. 9, 11-12.
62 James Pomeroy Hendrick, The United States
Antidumping Act, 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 914,

932 (1964) (noting just 73 findings of dumping between 1921 and 1964). From 1934 to 1954
there were only seven findings of dumping. Douglas A. Irwin, The Rise of US Anti-dumping
Activity in Historical Perspective, 28 World Econ. 651, 659 (2005). In 1954, this
responsibility was transferred to the ITC. Irwin, supra, at 659.
63 CBP Timeline, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., https://www.cbp.gov/about/history/

timeline-static-view [https://perma.cc/W7BP-7LEF] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
64 See Act of May 15, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-72, 12 Stat.
387, 387 (establishing USDA to
"procure ...

and distribute .. . valuable seeds and plants").
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acting on behalf of a beneficiary: the nation. By the early part of the
twentieth century, however, a new governance era was on the horizon.
C. Agency
Following the experimental authorities of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Congress began to delegate expanded control to the
President: to choose among trade-policy options and among trade
partners, and, in effect, to write trade law instruments. Intending to
facilitate increased foreign engagement on commercial matters, and

particularly to advance a new free-trade policy, a significant change
toward executive action on behalfof Congress marked the start of a new
era in trade governance, one that ought to be noted for its diversification
in form and in actors.
While the nineteenth-century view was that tariffs were critical for
revenue or to protect industry and the President played a limited role in
particular foreign-political circumstances or as fact finder, the twentiethcentury view, especially after the Depression, was that negotiating lower

tariffs was critical to economic success and the President was an
65
indispensable player in that exercise. Downplaying the significance of

this shift in authority at the time, the Supreme Court characterized the
President as "the mere agent" of Congress in the trade-lawmaking
process.66

I again begin with the legislative moments of significance before
turning to the vast sea of executive branch activity that emerges from
trade's agency and agencies.
1. Codified Cooperation
As agent, the President engaged with trading partners to secure the best

67
access for U.S. products and reduce tariff barriers for U.S. business. In
65 See Eckes, supra note 44, at 99.

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1928). In that case, an
importer contested the imposition of a duty of six cents per pound on barium dioxide, two
cents more than in the 1922 statute, after a 1924 proclamation by President Calvin Coolidge.
The Supreme Court ruled that the delegation of authority was constitutional because the
President was carrying out the will of Congress in changing the duty. Id. at 400, 411.
66

67 The use of a principal-agent framework as an analytical tool for understanding

congressional-executive relations in foreign affairs is not entirely novel in practice or
scholarship. Ed Swaine has described that there was a time when:
[D]iplomats were regarded as personal agents of a head of state, and could be viewed
in terms of a conventional principal-agent relationship, but identifying the principal
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contrast to the prior era, the President was no longer acting in the limited
circumstance of essentially flipping a switch in case of extraordinary

public interest as was the case when he acted as trustee. In the principalagent era, Congress and the institutional structure it created relied on the
President to take initiative and to guide the nation by composing new tools

where Congress could not. Implicit in this structure was an expectation
that the President would be faithful to the interests of Congress in
accordance with his delegation, but he maintained far greater discretion
within that domain.

Despite the enablement of the President on both tariffs and on

agreements, 68 and his further subdelegations to the State Department to
negotiate such agreements, 69 the general understanding at the time among

commentators was that Congress still retained not just ultimate authority
but rather complete authority on trade matters. Trade power started and
stopped with Congress. The Tariff Commission reported that "the rule or

principle or policy upon which tariff rates are to be determined is
distinctively a legislative problem," while the "finding of facts" to support

that undertaking was "essentially an administrative problem." 70 The
President executed on behalf of the principal.7 1

In a press conference in June 1933, President Roosevelt remarked that
"Congress would never give me complete authority to write tariff

(conceivably, the head of state, a legislature, or the state itself), the agent...
nature and consequences of delegated authority became less straightforward.

,

and the

Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2068 (2003). Daniel Abebe has
proposed viewing Congress as principal and the President as its agent in foreign affairs
generally. In contrast to my study, Abebe seeks to determine "the appropriate level of
deference to the President" based on a balancing of internal and external constraints to "ensure
that the President is a faithful agent" while also ensuring the President has enough "latitude to
achieve congressional goals." Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs

Law, 49 Stan. J. Int'l L. 1, 53 (2013).
68 See, e.g., Claussen, Trade's Security Exceptionalism,
supra note 14, at 1109. For example,
Section 3(e) of the National Industrial Recovery Act gave the President the power to use
import quotas or fees to regulate any imports found to "render ineffective or seriously to
endanger the maintenance of any code or agreement." Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 195,

197 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§ 703, terminated by Exec. Order 7252).

69 As early as 1923, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes sent a confidential circular
to
American diplomatic officers notifying them that the President had authorized the Secretary
of State to negotiate commercial treaties with other countries by which to accord each other
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. 1 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of

the United States, 1923, H.R. Doc. No. 68-397, at 131 (1938).
70
U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Sixth Annual Report 2 (1922).
71 Id.
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schedules." 72 The Roosevelt administration subsequently asked for the
authority to undertake additional trade negotiations "within carefully
guarded limits, to modify existing duties and import restrictions in such a
73
way as will benefit American agriculture and industry." This ask from
the Roosevelt administration led to the most important delegation to the
President to date: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934
("RTAA"). 74 The RTAA gave the President the authority to make trade

agreements by lowering tariffs that would take effect by presidential
proclamation alone. 75 It is regularly heralded as a major milestone in U.S.
trade history, but rarely with an eye to its institutional impact.
Although the RTAA seemed like an open-ended delegation, that was
not entirely the case. Congress as principal could still re-write its agent's
delegation contract. The legislation granted the President such authority
on a deadline and would periodically have to renew the power. For several
decades, in fact, a time-limited delegation provided Congress with
significant political leverage that it threatened to use to rein in the
President if he went astray in negotiations or in the course of other
exercises of his delegated authority.
2. OrganizationalExpansion

Just like in the trusteeship era, any retelling of trade lawmaking would
be incomplete if it focused only on these congressional-presidential
interactions. Since the establishment of the Tariff Commission and the
original soft delegations to executive officials, a trade law apparatus
began to take shape in the executive branch with accelerated pace. In the
agency period, new officials across diverse agencies developed
competencies on trade issues, and practices began that would empower
still others. Together, these developments would provide a bureaucratic
infrastructure to support the President's expanded facility. For example,
72 Presidential Press Conference (June 9, 1933), in 1 Complete Presidential Press

Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933, 364, 368-70 (1972).
73 Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 425.
74 Nzelibe, supra note 18, at 7 ("Formany scholars, congressional delegation was the crucial
constitutional innovation that ultimately overcame interest group capture.") (noting also that

political economy scholars are skeptical). As David Lake has commented, the important
difference of the RTAA as compared to prior delegations was that it delegated multiple
authorities simultaneously. David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International

Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, at 205 (1988).
5 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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in its original incarnation, the 1934 Act required the President to seek

information and advice from other agencies "and from such other sources

as he may deem appropriate." 76 The idea behind listing certain agencies

was to ensure a "balanced approach to tariff adjustments" and to avoid
domination by one agency in the Act's administration, but the success of
any such provision would depend on how the executive would apply it. 77
In practice, the President created an interagency organization. At its

center was a Committee on Trade Agreements which he intended to be a
successor to the short-lived Interdepartmental Advisory Board on
Reciprocity Treaties in place prior to the 1934 Act.78

The Secretary of State or other temporary advisors appointed by the
President took on leadership positions in this modest trade administrative
apparatus.79 Adjustments to trade policy were often the product of State
Department initiatives with the support of a small handful of interagency
committees. 80

Administration of the tariff was still entrusted to the Bureau of
Customs, responsible for determining the proper tariff classification of an

import, appraising it for purposes of customs valuation, and collecting the

resulting tariff.8 1 These administrative functions called for the exercise of

relatively little discretion, 82 but the Bureau's contribution to trade
lawmaking would move from executory in nature to quasi-judicial.

76

Id. at 945.

77

Harry C. Hawkins & Janet L. Norwood, The Legislative Basis of United States
Commercial Policy, in Studies in United States Commercial Policy 69, 100 (William
B. Kelly,

Jr. ed., 1963).
78 Id. at 101. See also Harry C. Hawkins, Administration of the Trade
Agreements Act, 1944
Wis. L. Rev. 3, 8-9 (1944); Henry J. Tasca, The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States:

A Study in Trade Philosophy 49-50 (1938).
79 Some temporary advisory positions came and went. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 6,651, 3
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 158, 158-60 (Mar. 23, 1934)
(creating a special trade advisor).

80 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9,832, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 126, 127 (1947) (creating the
Committee); Exec. Order No. 6,651, 3 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 158, 158-60 (Mar. 23, 1934) (creating the Office of the Special Adviser to the

President on Foreign Trade).
8 For greater detail, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff

History, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 285, 286 (1986).

82 Historically, "neither the Bureau of Customs nor any other agency was empowered to set
or change tariff rates as such." Id.
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Unlike other areas of lawmaking, legislators did not see outsourcing as
83
possible or favorable in tariff-making. For this reason, Congress elected
84
to give the Tariff Commission more authority, intending to make the
85 but not to give the
tariff more "scientific" and less "political,"
Commission the ability to adjust rates in significant ways. Under this plan,
Congress made the Tariff Commission "an integral part" of trade
lawmaking 6 by receiving and investigating petitions from various
stakeholders in the private sector. Commentators noted, however, that the
administration of this new system was not practical. The Commission was
woefully underprepared and understaffed for such a national
undertaking. 87 Moreover, this move was not successful in taking the
"tariff out of politics," 88 but rather just moved politics to the Commission.
These were the growing pains of the new trade bureaucracy.
From the 1930s forward, Congress sought to push several trade law and

89
policy decisions out of the legislative process to the executive. These
institutions became the central focus of trade lawmaking for the first time.
Executive agencies acted under the President's leadership whether they
served in fact-finding roles, investigatory capacities, quasi-judicial
functions, or made other contributions. Still, taken together, executive
trade-lawmaking arrangements during this period were simple. The State

Department was the lead agency acting under the President's direction for
delegation. 90

international delegations pursuant to the congressional
Decision making occurred through a hierarchical, vertical construct
83 Stephen D. Cohen, The Making of United States International Economic Policy:

Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform 17 (5th ed. 2000). One can speculate if this
was due to capture or for some other reason. Compare to the experience in interstate commerce

or public utilities.
" Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 94143.
85 Tarullo, supra note 81, at 319 (noting that it was structured to be scientific).
86 Id. at 313.
87 From 1922 to 1929, more than 600 petitions covering 375 commodities were filed with
the Commission and only 47 investigations covering 55 commodities were completed. U.S.
Tariff Comm'n, Thirteenth Annual Report 10 (1929).
88 Lake, supra note 74, at 196.
89 Tarullo, supra note 81, at 350-51.

Id.; see also Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Hearings on H.J. Res.
407 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 76th Cong. 491-500 (1940) (statement of A.
Manuel Fox, Member, U.S. Tariff Comm'n) (describing the State Department's role in
overseeing the Tariff Commission and its procedures for cooperation with other agencies);
Grace Beckett, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program 18 (1941) (describing the State
90

Department's role in initiating new trade agreements with countries).
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through which the President would engage with the State Department and
the State Department would coordinate a small number of interagency
committees in furtherance of our trade policy. 9 1 The President's
authorizations were specific and concrete such that, as agent, he "could

exercise no discretion by which he might vary the will of the legislative
body." 92 Meanwhile, the Tariff Commission provided information to
Congress for tariff adjustments, and the Bureau of Customs executed

those tariff rates at the ports.
This push toward the executive unsurprisingly enhanced the trade

authorities and the legitimacy of their exercise across the branch. The
expansive institutionalization contributed to a further transformation in
governance. By the second half of the twentieth century, the principalagent period had given way to a new period: a managerial one.
II. OUR MANAGERIAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION
This Part does the institutional mapping of the present configuration of

trade administration, what I call "managerialism" in today's robust trade
administrative state. It does so in some detail for the primary reason that
this work has not been done before. Legal scholars have neglected these
activities even as vigorous legal bars have grown to address them. A

second reason for undertaking this original study is that, while a lot of
what happens in the rest of the regulatory state is written down and

therefore easily studied, in trade, little is written, and therefore a detailed
qualitative and empirical approach is necessary.
I begin by providing a positive theory for our managerial moment,

arguing that managerial trade administration has emerged as a result of
both market and legislative forces. Working through these causes helps
lay the groundwork for the present institutional features. First, I analyze
the growth of the trade law manager: a central agency with
"superpowers," the Office of the United States Trade Representative
("USTR"). Next, I maintain that USTR, distinct from Congress or the

President, manages and operates trade lawmaking in its broadest form
through a handful of unseen but pervasive operational controls. 93
91 The State Department ran the Committee for Reciprocity Information, for one. U.S. Dep't

of State, 41 Dep't of State Bull. No. 1,054, at 354-55 (Sept. 7, 1959).
92 William A. Foster & Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 15, 22 (1932).

9 The idea of identifying managers in the law is not new either in the domestic
or
international context. I adopt the term here as a further extension and new application of the
concept-one that I believe more aptly captures what is happening in trade. I do not
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Consequently, the management function of USTR serves as a type of

administrative constraint-and one that goes above and beyond
traditional political concerns that may be raised in the interagency review
process to incorporate also legal considerations.
Managerial trade administration is characterized by distinct features as
compared to prior periods-and it is about far more than just the presence
of USTR as practical and normative manager. The label captures a set of
relationships within the executive branch in which multiple agencies are
engaged

in

trade

lawmaking

through

rulemaking,

monitoring,

adjudication, and enforcement. Managerial administration moves beyond
the simplistic bimodal or trimodal models of agency and trusteeship in

recognition of expanding regime complexity with the emergence of

polycentric and sometimes rivalrous nodes of authority and Congress
largely fading from the picture. Much, but not all, of that is centrally
coordinated and most of that likewise involves agencies working directly
with foreign counterparts. As will become clear, this activity is carried
out largely without traditional administrative review mechanisms. It is an
administrative system of governance unlike anything that came before it
and distinct from what occurs in other areas of law.
A. Positive Theories
1. Tradification

By the middle of the twentieth century, the agency model, with its
narrow and limited delegated activities, no longer sufficed for the
development of a coherent and consistent trade policy. Trade claimed
relevance in regulation by way of a growing free trade norm and served
as a vehicle for achieving multinational regulatory goals. These symbiotic
trends, what I call "tradification," forced a transformation away from

subsequently adopt all the same consequences that priorcommentators have identified in their
spaces,

but I draw on them for inspiration. For other iterations, see,

e.g., Bijal

Shah, Congress's Agency Coordination, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1961, 2058 (2019) (referring to
the President as a manager of the executive branch); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler

3
Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements

(1995) (examining international law compliance through a managerial model); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 378 (1982) (referring to judges as managers of their
cases).
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agency to a new governance model. 94 Developments in the global
economy, advances in technology, as well as government attempts to

bolster free trade were the primary push factors toward this new model,
but they would later be supplemented by an internally expansive
regulatory system within the United States.

First, international trade negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s shifted
attention from the reduction of traditional tariff barriers to the elimination
of "non-tariff barriers" to trade such as licensing requirements, health and
safety regulations, and other administrative measures that could be
considered discriminatory to foreign business. Consequently, the move
toward free trade at the international level required that the major
economies in the multilateral conversation would take steps to harmonize
such rules or otherwise commit to avoiding unfair treatment in those

additional areas-many of which had a direct impact on domestic
rulemaking. Take, for example, food safety and labeling. Once an issue
of solely domestic concern, today food safety and food labeling matters
are regulated through the rules agreed within the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") and other international organizations."
Comprehensive international rules govern what the U.S. Food and Drug

Administration can do in this respect should it wish to be consistent with
those rules. 96 Falling outside them could mean the measure would be
subject to a challenge under the WTO dispute settlement system. 97 This
codification change enhanced trade's trans-substantivity and demanded
engagement across the administrative state.
Expanding markets and the proliferation of cross-border supply chains

through globalizing trends forced a dramatic change to the idea and
practice of trade law during this same time frame. Taken together, it
became clear to some lawmakers that the State Department was no longer
equipped for the regulatory monitoring and implementation that would be

required in this new era. Domestic rules were needed to police these new
global trade flows just as those rules were also the subject of foreign
94 Jeff Dunoff identified some of the same trends as they began. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade
and": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political

Implications, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 759, 760 (1997).

9 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 14, 1994,
1867
U.N.T.S.
154,
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/15-sps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MG9R-CTQK].
96 Id.
97 Dispute Settlement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/English/tratope-/dispu_e/dispue.htm

[https://perma.cc/7U6A-4T76].
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negotiations. The market and the multilateral negotiations on non-tariff
barriers pushed trade into the far reaches of our administrative state.
With such spacious contours, it is difficult today to determine what is
98
counted in or counted out of "trade law." Trade law suffers from a
boundary problem: not knowing where it starts and finishes, and unable
99
to contain all that may fall within its scope. It encompasses tools that
include traditional border measures, like tariffs, but it also involves
regulatory measures that in prior decades would not be considered to fall
under the trade umbrella at all. It covers private rights of action as much
as it governs state action.

A corollary of this expansion and the capaciousness of "trade" is that
areas of policy that were once siloed (or that did not exist) became part of
trade policy making because they have a transnational and economic
aspect to them. For instance, in 2001, USTR created an office for labor

issues.1 00 Rather than rely on the Department of Labor to advise it on
trade-related labor matters, it incorporated that expertise into its office
around the same time that labor provisions became a permanent fixture in
trade agreements. 101 In this way, tradification has had a mutually
reinforcing effect: as states have expanded the list of topics falling under
trade's harmonization and rulemaking across borders, they have made
more of their own rulemaking subject to international rules. Tradification
ushered in a new form of governance as the law became both a policy task
and a policy limit across many agencies.

9

See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global

Governance, 16 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Affs. 209, 211-12, 221-38 (2011) (providing an
overview of the expansion of trade agreements).
99 This "problem" could be considered a feature more than a bug by those that use trade law
to regulate and enforce international commitments in newfound areas. I have explored this

double-edged sword in other work. See Kathleen Claussen, Our Trade Law System, 73 Vand.
L. Rev. En Banc 195, 198-201 (2020).
10° 146 Cong. Rec. 6,805-06 (2000).
101 Id. at 6,806. Most of USTR's offices were established this way. Only three are mentioned

in statute: two in "sense of Congress" statements and one referring to the responsibilities of
the Assistant United States Trade Representative for Industry and Telecommunications (a role

that no longer exists as such). 19 U.S.C. §§ 3724, 4208, 3812. For example, the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 included a "sense of Congress" statement, making note of the
importance of having an Assistant United States Trade Representative for African Affairs.

Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 117, 114 Stat. 251, 267 (2000) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3724). More
recently, Congress has created specific positions at the ambassador rank such as the Chief
Agricultural Negotiator, Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property Negotiator, and Chief
Transparency Officer. Id. at 293.
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Market transformations have likewise favored a larger trade
administrative state with increased complexity to the global marketplace.
One can see this change in Trade Promotion Authority ("TPA")

legislation where Congress lays out the subject areas that any free trade
agreement should cover. The 2015 TPA legislation, for example, covers
21 issue areas in the negotiating objectives ranging from "trade in goods"
to "anti-corruption."' 0 2 By one count, there are today 500 customs-related
laws that are administered by 47 agencies. 03

As the concept of what constituted trade law expanded, so did the trade
law bureaucracy. As a statutory matter, both Commerce and Treasury are

tasked with major international economic policy making and execution.'

04

Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") continues its historical role of
implementing policies put in place by Congress and the other agencies of

the executive branch and likewise counseling to advise them in their
work. In the 2015 Trade Facilitation Act alone, Congress issued CBP 100
different mandates.' 05
In addition to these "traditional" trade players, other major departments

play important roles in trade law and policy development and execution.
For example, most agricultural trade policy originates with the USDA. 106

102 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.

114-26, § 102, 129 Stat. 320 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4201). USTR likewise indicates that it

is monitoring agreements for compliance in topics as diverse as financial services and tomato
paste. See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2020 Trade Policy Agenda and 2019
Annual Report 8, 165 (2020) [hereinafter 2019 Annual Report], https://ustr.gov/

sites/default/files/2020_TradePolicyAgenda and_2019_AnnualReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKT7-4M3E].

103 Authorizing Customs and

Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border & Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec.,
113th Cong. 18 (2014) (statement of Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Deputy Comm'r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot.). At least seventeen agencies, engaged in some exercise of trade
policy making, regularly conduct U.S. trade and international economic functions under
various statutory and administrative authorities. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO-00-76, Strategy
Needed to Better Monitor and Enforce Trade Agreements 4 (2000) [hereinafter GAO-00-76].
104 For example, the Commerce Department facilitates the trade remedies program as set out
in 19 U.S.C. chapter 4. See 19 U.S.C. § 1339. The Treasury also engages in major economic
regulation through engagement in international affairs. See David Zaring, Administration by

Treasury, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 187, 212-13 (2010).

105 See generally Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-

125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016) (scattered sections).
106 See generally U.S. Dep't of Agric.,

Trade

Policies

and

Procedures,

https://www.usda.gov/topics/trade/trade-policies-and-procedures (providing an overview of
the various trade programs that the USDA has in place for "commodities and agricultural

products") [https://perma.cc/P9JQ-HKHX] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).

VirginiaLaw Review

874

[Vol. 107:845

Health and Human Services and the Department of Labor each maintain
a trade role: the former primarily through the Food and Drug
Administration and the latter by monitoring compliance with the labor
chapters of U.S. trade agreements, tracking eligibility for certain trade
preferences, and administering the Trade Adjustment Assistance program

for workers. 107 Looking even deeper, we can identify foreign commerce

regulation in the Department of the Interior, Department of Defense,

108 And, the State
Department of Energy, and still other agencies.
Department still oversees U.S. trade and economic relationships through
its bureaus and embassies, and through the negotiation of bilateral
109

investment treaties.
The ITC's tasks have continued to expand likewise in several areas of
our trade law. Today, the ITC investigates injuries caused by dumping,

subsidies, import surges, as well as alleged infringement of U.S.
intellectual property rights. Its work is partly judicial, partly prescriptive,

and partly administrative."

0

The modern trade administrative state also incorporates some statutory
inter-agency mechanisms, including for engagement with the private

sector. On the private side, the high-level President's Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations examines U.S. trade policy

and agreements for the overall national interest."' Members represent key
sectors. Additional policy advisory committees comprising roughly 700
members and covering areas such as agriculture, labor, and environment
107 See Shayerah I. Akhtar, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who

Does What? (2020). We could add more to this executive trade landscape such as the ExportImport Bank, which "finances and insures U.S. exports of goods and services"; the Small
Business Administration, which administers grants in support of trade; or the agencies that
support trade capacity building or that promote economic growth in developing countries,
such as United States Agency for International Development, United States International

Development Finance Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency. See id.
108 See Thomas R. Graham, The Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and
Problems, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 221, 228 & n.38 (1980). Even the Federal Emergency
Management Agency took on new trade tasks during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Export

Allocation

Rule

on Medical

Supplies

and Equipment

for COVID-19,

FEMA,

https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-implementation-allocation-order-exports-scarce-ppe-

and-notice-exemptions [https://perma.cc/R5ER-YZ8S] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
109 Cohen, supra note 83, at 46 (discussing the "crowding out" of the State Department).

"0 See About the USITC, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/

about usitc.htm [https://perma.cc/8EPB-7FY7](last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
"I

Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Charter of the Advisory Committee for Trade

Policy and Negotiations (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/about/ACTPN%
20Charter%2020l8-2022%20USTR.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5J-X5FK].
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examine issues from their respective specific policy lenses.'1

2

These

coordinated mechanisms are among the many ways that the several
agencies involved in trade lawmaking receive input from the private
sector.

This statutory and institutional portrait of the trade administrative state,
as scattered and obscured as it is, is still incomplete. For one, codified
organizational provisions only give us the top layer. They fail to portray
the important work that occurs among civil servants in their quotidian
encounters. 1 3 Among each other, they are advocates for their subject

area, interlocutors on matters of law and policy, agenda setters, and
gatekeepers for issues and enforcement.' 1 4 Neither does the overview
capture precisely the work in which these agencies engage and

particularly

their trade-lawmaking

activities. 1

Multiple

agencies

reinforce and make trade law in their outreach to foreign governments and
their transnational regulatory counterparts. They work in three
dimensions-horizontal, vertical, and diagonal. Horizontally, agencies

collaborate with others in the executive branch to develop trade law rules.
Vertically, executive agencies engage with the White House and with
Congress in the development of policy objectives or manipulate those

same hierarchies to shield their regulatory activities from these elected
officials. Diagonally, the actors in the trade administrative state work
directly with foreign governments and private actors in these same rulewriting, -monitoring, and -enforcing operations.
For another, the structural topography does not reflect how the system
that has developed is kept in check. Rather than be subject to traditional

administrative law disciplines, the trade-lawmaking activities of these
agencies are subject to little to no review in terms of public input. The
precise situation varies depending on the agency or the activity, but often

there is limited notice and comment, limited judicial review, and limited

112 Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Advisory Committees, https://ustr.gov/about-

us/advisory-committees [https://perma.cc/24US-G53A] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).

"3 Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 Harv.

L. Rev. 546, 595-96 (1987) (noting that lower-level committees composed chiefly of civil
servants develop information).
"4 Id.
"5 See Kathleen Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements 10-14 (unpublished manuscript)

(on file with the author) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements] (describing a
category of trade lawmaking-trade executive agreements--that is a mix of free trade
agreements, solo executive agreements, and rules issued by agencies, has largely grown out
of recent practice, and is thus understudied).
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checks for arbitrary or capricious decision making. As will be shown

below, trade lawmaking is administered through a separate and distinct
control system.
It is impossible to fully and appropriately capture all that the present

tradified landscape entails. At a minimum, this brief overview reveals a
dispersed authority across many agencies. All of this must be funneled
into a coherent policy. Thus, most important to this story is that at least
one agency, USTR, coordinates this work.
2. The Rise of a Trade Super-Agency

Congress directed the President to appoint a Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations in 1962116 to balance the competing interests between

U.S. domestic and foreign policy among the range of trade-related
agencies and the many domestic stakeholders as tradification
proliferated. 1 7 Legislators at the time called the role, which would later
become the USTR, a necessary "focal point" for coordinating trade
policy."1 8 The following year, President Kennedy created in the Executive
Office of the President what was intended to be the "interagency
9
organization" set out in the statute." At its head, the position of USTR

would be appointed "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"
120
with the "rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary."
USTR's original role was modest. First and foremost, it was the "chief
2
representative" of the United States in trade negotiations. ' Further, the
1962 Act required the USTR to "seek information and advice with respect

to each negotiation from representatives of industry, agriculture, and
22
To support the
labor, and from such agencies as he deems appropriate."
new position, President Kennedy created an office for the USTR in the

116 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 241, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801).
117

Graham, supra note 108, at 224-25 (describing the role of the trade representative in the

early years of the position); H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40 (1973) ("[T]he position was created
to provide both better focus and centralized direction for treating trade negotiations and trade
problems from an overall commercial point of view-and to downplay the strictly foreign
policy orientation ... of the Department of State.").

"' H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40 (1973) (declaring that the USTR was created "with the
implicit intention of providing the Congress with a focal point in the executive branch").
119 Exec. Order No. 11,075, 3 C.F.R. 692-96 (1963); Trade Expansion Act § 242.
120 Trade Expansion Act § 241(a).
121 Id.
122 Id. § 241(b), 76 Stat. at 878.
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Executive Office of the President-the administrative body that houses
the White House Office, the National Security Council, the OMB, among
other small agencies. 123

In the first decade, the Special Trade Representative and his two
deputies principally represented the United States in the multilateral trade
negotiations taking place at that time.' 2 4 The Office had 28 employees

from 1964 to 1969125 and worked closely with other agencies in the
government to acquire the requisite expertise for this purpose. That would
change over time as USTR grew and expanded its expertise in both
regional issues, specific subject issues, and legal affairs. By 1980, the

Office employed 113 staff.1 26 By 1997, there were 164 USTR staff

members. 2 7 Today, there are roughly 250.128
The Trade Act of 1974 changed the trade-lawmaking landscape in two
significant respects. First, it created a process for Congress to approve

trade agreements known as "fast-track" or, today, as Trade Promotion

Authority ("TPA").1 2 9 At the center of this process is the USTR acting on

the President's behalf to negotiate trade agreements with U.S. partners.
Second, and relatedly, the 1974 Act expanded the USTR's role
substantially. The Act set out that the USTR shall:
(A) be the chief representative of the United States for each trade
negotiation under this title or section 301; (B) . .. be responsible to the
President and the Congress for the administration of trade agreements
programs under [various Acts]; (C) advise the President and Congress
with respect to nontariff barriers to international trade, international
commodity agreements, and other matters which are related to the trade
agreements programs; (D) be responsible for making reports to
Congress with respect to [the above]; (E) be chairman of the

12 History of the United States
Trade Representative, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/history [https://perma.cc/3YYL-DX6B] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).

124 Id.
121 Fred

O. Boadu & Jie Shen, An Empirical Analysis of the Growth and Autonomy
of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 6 Currents: Int'l Trade L.J. 3, 9 (1997).
126 Id.
127

Id.

See Exec. Off. of the President, Office of the United States Trade
Representative: Fiscal
Year Budget 2021, at 6 (2020), https:/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/foia-/USTR%20FY%20
28

2021% 2 0Congressional%20Budget%20Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGP6-LT4T].

129 In a recent symposium, I summarized the historical and legal foundations for fast-track.

Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: The Changing Role of the Executive in U.S. Trade
Lawmaking, 24 Ind. J. Glob. Legal Stud. 345, 351-52, 351 n.18 (2017).
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interagency trade organization ... ; and (F) be responsible for such
30
other functions as the President may direct.1

Nevertheless, these extensive responsibilities did not do enough in the
eyes of Congress or the private sector to effectively coordinate the
executive-trade machinery. By early 1978, conversation began in
Congress about creating a new trade department or again altering the
division of responsibility among existing departments. 131 Ultimately,

lawmakers settled on a minimalist approach in the subsequent
32
Reorganization Plan of 1979, proposed by the Carter Administration.1

In that Reorganization Plan, the President concentrated nearly all the trade
responsibilities within USTR and Commerce. Commerce largely had the
role of administering and operating existing trade remedies programs

such as those available through anti-dumping and countervailing duty
laws. The Reorganization tasked the USTR with primary responsibility
for "developing, and for coordinating the implementation of, United

States international trade policy, including commodity matters and, to the
extent they are related to international trade policy, direct investment

130 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141, 88 Stat. 1978, 1999 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2171). These moves reflected a congressional interest in enhancing executive

authority while also maintaining control on the executive's work in the trade space: "We have
also endeavored to articulate an appropriate cooperative role for the Congress and the

executive branch in an effort to come to grips with these very complex problems and issues in
which delegation of congressional authority is needed." H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 15 (1973);
see also Claussen, Trading Spaces, supra note 129, at 350-54 (providing an overview of the
balancing of the trade-policy roles and responsibilities that Congress and the executive branch
hold); 15 C.F.R. § 2001.3 (2020) (establishing that the U.S. Trade Representative reports to
and is responsible to both the executive branch and Congress).
Hearing on S.
131 See, e.g., To Create a Department of International Trade and Investment:

1990 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 95th Cong. 1 (1978) (statement of Sen.
William V. Roth, Member, Comm. on Governmental Affs.); Reorganizing the Government's
International Trade and Investment Functions: Hearing on S. 377, S. 891, S. 937, S. 1471, and
S. 1493 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 96th Cong. 2, 44, 47 (1979) (statements
of Sen. Robert C. Byrd and Adlai E. Stevenson); Proposed Foreign Trade Reorganization:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. 2-4 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Frank Horton); Federal Government International Trade Function

Reorganization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
96th Cong. 114-16 (1979) (statement of William N. Walker, Vice Chairman, Com. Pol'y
Comm., U.S. Council of the Int'l Chamber of Com.); International Trade and Investment

Reorganization Act, H.R. 3859, 96th Cong. § 2(b) (1979).
132 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (proposed Sept. 25, 1979); see
Graham, supra note 108, at 222 & n.5 (1980) (discussing inter-branch communications on
reorganization).
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matters."1 3 3 Under this arrangement, USTR had the lead in overseeing
policy supervision and coordination. The Reorganization also replaced
the interagency trade group known as the Trade Agreements Committee

with the Trade Policy Committee: a cabinet-level interagency committee
that would advise USTR.' 34 The 1979 Trade Act likewise granted the
USTR increased responsibility, made the USTR an indispensable actor on

more trade activities by requiring other secretaries work with the USTR,
and created additional various duties to report and consult to Congress.1 35
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 further elevated
USTR's role to coordinate trade policy, to serve as the President's
principal trade advisor and trade "spokesman," and to lead U.S.
international trade negotiations.1 36 Whereas the 1974 Act mentions the

USTR 49 times in a collection of provisions that include some mandates,

some inputs, and some discretionary engagement, by 1988, USTR is
mentioned 265 times, including in a "sense of Congress" statement that
made clear its importance.1 37 The 1988 Act also continued a pattern of

moving presidential delegations to the USTR, among other tasks.1 38

As these statutes and the preceding tradification story begin to reveal,
USTR has grown into a managerial role-supervising and coordinating

trade lawmaking-as the result of a confluence of mutually reinforcing
factors. In addition to the congressional delegations and organic need for

greater coordination and trade expanded, the President regularly has
subdelegated and continues to subdelegate his delegated authorities to the
USTR. These subdelegations make up much of USTR's authority.1 39 The
133 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 1(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (proposed Sept.
25,
1979).

134 Shayerah Ilias, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42555, Trade Reorganization:
Overview and Issues

for Congress 11 (2012).
135 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 411, 413, 93 Stat. 144, 243-44
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2543).
136 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, § 1601(a)(1),
102 Stat. 1107, 1260 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)).
13 See id. § 1601(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 1261.
"8 See, e.g., id. § 1301(a), 102 Stat. at 1164 (granting the USTR authority to respond to the
denial or violation of U.S. trade rights under any trade agreement, subject only to any "specific
direction" from the President).
139 See, e.g., Memorandum, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,251 (July 21, 2005) (delegating authority under

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930); Proclamation 6,942, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,719 (Oct. 17,

1996) (delegating authority related to the Generalized System of Preferences); Exec. Order

No. 12,964, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (June 21, 1995) (stating that the USTR shall perform the
functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act); Exec. Order No.

12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988) (delegating the authority of the President to the
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President has also used his delegated authority to create new trade-related
bodies. 140 Both Congress and the President could justify giving more
141
power to USTR because each saw USTR as its own.

Further, in response to audits of USTR's work, USTR itself has taken
efforts to grow and specialize in various respects. It developed functional
and regional offices such that it no longer needed to rely on other agencies
14 2
for subject-matter expertise. Instead, it brought that expertise in-house.
Today, USTR resembles a mini-government in its internal structure with

both country-specific offices and policy offices that specialize in all the
substantive areas relevant to trade. That organizational structure was not
1 43
mandated by statute.
Over its 50 years, USTR changed from acting as a coordinator and lead
agency in the area of trade agreements to serving as a manager of foreign
commerce law and policy for the United States. Although the language in

the legislation and in congressional records suggests that Congress is
1
managing U.S. trade lawmaking, in practice that is not the case. 44 The

next Section illustrates the breadth and importance of USTR's present
operational controls that make it a powerful manager. Many of the
managerial functions have developed apart from any written statute or
regulation. They are informal but have legal force.

USTR under the 1988 Act). This is especially true up until the early 2000s when USTR grew
in influence and size. Many statutory delegations to USTR come from statutes enacted in the

last 30 years. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 122(b), 108
Stat. 4809, 4829 (Dec. 8, 1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3532) (specifying that the USTR has
lead responsibility on matters related to the World Trade Organization).
140 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,964, 60 Fed. Reg. at 33,095 (creating a Commission on
United States-Pacific Trade and Investment Policy); Exec. Order No. 12,870, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,753 (Sept. 30, 1993) (creating the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee); Exec. Order
No. 12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (Mar. 25, 1994) (creating the Trade and Environment Policy
Advisory Committee within the Office of the United States Trade Representative).
to take
141 This arrangement was part of the point of creating the USTR in the first place:
this power away from Congress where interest groups dominated.

142 See, e.g., USTR Announces New Office to Monitor China Deal's Implementation,
Handle Disputes, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 14, 2020), https://insidetrade.com/trade/ustrannounces-new-office-monitor-china-deals-.implementation-handle-disputes
[https://perma.cc/AU6J-955Q].
'43 Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 2001.2 (1975) (establishing the Office as consisting of the United States
Trade Representative and two Deputy Trade Representatives).
'44 H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40-41 (1973) (noting that there has not been enough

coordination with Congress from 1962 to 1973 and expecting that the USTR would be
"speaking for the United States and the Congress in the forthcoming multilateral trade
negotiations").
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B. ManagerialControls
As compared to prior eras of trade administration in which the State

Department acted pursuant to a presidential direction, or the President
himself made a determination within the confines of a congressional

delegation, our present managerial era involves a qualitative distinction
in form. USTR has come to manage nearly all aspects of trade lawmaking,

just as the definition of "trade" itself has grown. Unlike other agencies,
however, USTR's mandates are scattered across many different areas of
law. 4 5 And also unlike other agencies, USTR is not clearly subject to the
same administrative review despite engaging in admin-style lawmaking.
The early idea that USTR simply would represent the United States

abroad, coordinate the interagency organization, and advise and report to
both branches on trade matters was quickly displaced in practice.1 46 In the

managerial model, USTR controls the process and has a strong hand in
the outcome. It operationalizes this control through at least three
mechanisms: rulemaking and overseeing rulemaking, adjudicating and
enforcing, and monitoring both domestic agencies and foreign partners.
First, USTR controls trade lawmaking by writing rules, but its
rulemaking exercises differ from those of other agencies. To illustrate just

how different USTR is from other agencies, I conducted a search in the
Federal Register of its notices and proposed and issued rules from 1995

to 2019. During that period, USTR issued only 17 rules, 8 proposed rules
(since 1998 they are all related to the Freedom of Information Act), and
1,603 notices. 4 7 To put these in perspective, just taking notices alone in
this same time period, the EPA has issued roughly 51,000 notices, the

USDA roughly 32,000, and the FDA roughly 19,000. Nevertheless,
USTR regularly engages in at least two types of what I call "rulemaking":

first, pursuant to authorities delegated by Congress, USTR determines
tariff rates and other import or export rules, and second, USTR negotiates
binding rules in agreements with foreign counterparts.

1 For a sampling of relevant statutes, see Staff of H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, 113th

Cong., Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes, at v-xi (Comm. Print 2013).
146 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 1999.

147 Nor is USTR subject to the levels of litigation that other agencies are subject to as
discussed in Parts III and IV, but it does hold hearings on some of its investigations. By
comparison, CBP has issued 289 rules, 91 proposed rules, and 2,673 notices since it was
created in 2003; the ITC issued 44 rules, 30 proposed rules, and 8,194 notices in the same
period (1995-2019); the ITA issued 72 rules, 57 proposed rules, and 18,937 notices in the
same period.
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With respect to its first type of "rulemaking," USTR has the power to
carry out an investigation and then implement restrictions or tariffs. It

may conduct a public hearing and issue notice, but it does not follow
typical administrative processes in doing so. Take Section 301 of the

8
Trade Act of 1974, for example.1 4 Under this statute, the USTR is tasked
with determining whether an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S.

commerce.14 9 When USTR makes such a determination, USTR may

impose restrictions on trade in goods from that country or enter into an
agreement that would put an end to the act, policy, or practice.' 0 It may
take steps to impose a rule on private entities about market access or
import taxes. Moreover, the agency can decide the content of those
51
rules-the level, scope, and breadth of the regulation.' The statute does
not refer to the APA, and USTR typically has not used ordinary notice

1 52
and comment rulemaking for this purpose. Nevertheless, the outcome
is the same: USTR can restrict activities by private parties with the force
of law. 53

USTR also determines and applies provisions to exempt certain private
5 4
actors from those restrictions.' Recently, as it has employed increasingly
48 Trade Act 130§ 301 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
149 19 U.S.C. § 2411. See also Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions

in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 Mich. J. Int'l L. 735, 742 (1989)
(explaining both the mandatory and discretionary actions that the USTR must take for
violations of trade agreements or harm to U.S. commerce).
150 Trade Act § 301(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.

§ 2411(b)). This authority was
shifted to USTR and away from the President in the 1988 Act. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
'5' Section 301 addresses the activities of U.S. firms abroad and interference by foreign
governments to the detriment of U.S. firms. See Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S.
Trade Law and Policy Series #10: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair
Trade Cases, 21 Int'l Law. 211, 213-15 (1987).
152 Whether USTR's imposition of tariffs under Section 301 is subject to the APA despite
the statute's lack of a clear statement is under consideration at the CIT at the time of writing.

HMTX Indus. LLC v. United States, No. 20-00177 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed Sept. 10, 2020).
Section 301 sets out a process for USTR to reach its determination but whether that supersedes
USTR's obligations under the APA and whether the application of Section 301 falls within
the APA's foreign-affairs exception are live questions.
153 To be sure, the statute does provide for a public hearing in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(4), 2414(b)(1)(A). But that is not always the case in USTR's actions

nor does the statute set out procedures for how the public hearing is conducted. The statute

provides a type of functional notice and comment.
154 This has occurred most recently in USTR's exclusion process related to the Section 301
tariffs on products from China. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Zhiyao Lu, The USTR Tariff
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more tariff authorities, the agency's quasi-adjudicatory, quasi-rulemaking
authority on exemptions (known as "exclusions") has grown in parallel.
In 2019 and 2020, it processed thousands of requests and engaged a
collection of contractors to be able to do so.' 55 Applying exclusions from
these tariffs is yet another manifestation of this type of special

rulemaking, even if not called such.
With respect to its second form of "rulemaking," USTR writes

internationally and domestically enforceable laws in its negotiations with
trading partners in the context of the WTO or in negotiating free trade
agreements ("FTAs"). Operating under expansive strokes of authority
delegated from Congress,15 6 USTR approves the form and content of the
obligations to which the U.S. government commits itself. But USTR also

writes smaller "trade executive agreements" with trading partners and
determines which countries and companies get access to special
treatment.1 57 FTAs are subject to ex post congressional review, but trade
executive agreements are not. 158
Importantly, these issues have taken on increased relevance since 2018

as the Trump administration has relied more heavily on both types of
rulemaking.1

59

These broad applications of statutory authorities-far

exceeding their prior use-have called attention to those authorities'
procedural omissions and limitations. Whether in the making of the rules
or thereafter, traditional administrative law disciplines often do not

Exclusion Process: Five Things to Know About These Opaque Handouts, Peterson Inst. for
Int'l Econ. (Dec. 19. 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policywatch/ustr-tariff-exclusion-process-five-things-know-about-these
[https://perma.cc/33N8-

QJUZ].
I See, e.g., Isabelle Icso, White House Requests $6 Million Boost for USTR in FY2021
Budget Proposal, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 11, 2020, 2:47 PM), https://insidetrade.com/dailynews/white-house-requests-6-million-boost-ustr-fy2021-budget-proposal

[https://perma.cc/5B3R-MFFT].
156

See, e.g., Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub.

L. No. 114-26,

§ 103, 129 Stat. 320, 333 (codified as amended 19 USC § 4202).

"7 See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement Text, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/apan-korea-apec/apan/us-japan-trade-agreementnegotiations/us-japan-trade-agreement-text [https://perma.cc/2Q2E-ST6X ] (last visited Apr.
19, 2021) ("eliminat[ing] or reduc[ing] tariffs on certain agricultural and industrial products").
The term "trade executive agreement" is mine and the subject of a separate project, a
manuscript of which is on file with the author. See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements,
supra note 115, at 3.
5 This is a matter of debate. See Claussen, Trade Executive
Agreements, supra note 115,

at 10-12.
159 See Claussen, Trade's Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1149-51.
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expressly apply to USTR or to other agencies with which USTR works

on trade-related matters. 160 This lack of administrative oversight alters the
incentives that trade-engaged agencies would otherwise face. In the
absence of conventional checks, they do not face pressure to provide
61
information ex ante in their rulemaking.' USTR's rule-writing control.
mechanism is strengthened by unparalleled latitude and secrecy through
162
which USTR is able to work.
Second, USTR controls trade lawmaking by monitoring. Its monitoring

also takes two forms: external and internal. USTR monitors other
countries' compliance with international trade rules and it monitors other
U.S. agencies' activities to ensure compliance with U.S. international

trade

agreement

obligations.

The

external

monitoring

role

is

straightforward. USTR investigates whether trading partners are engaged

in behavior or governmental measures that are contrary to international
rules. 63 In 2015, Congress codified the establishment of a monitoring and
enforcement center within USTR to ensure effective support for this
activity.1

64

More important is that USTR reviews U.S. agency draft rules that may
have a connection with cross-border commerce before it is
promulgated.1 65 It advises agencies inwardly on their compliance with or

160

For some past relevant commentary insofar as international economic negotiations are

concerned, see David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91
Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 84 (2013) (discussing how there is no role for the process requirements
of the APA where agencies negotiate rules with foreign counterparts).
161

Id. at 83 (commenting that the threat of judicial review may have led to an expansion in

detail in administrative agencies' work).
162 While administrative constraints need not be the only types of constraints on an agency,

USTR also is subject to limited congressional or presidential oversight as I and others have
noted in previous work. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1, at 1204-06, 1213-14.
163 Monitoring and Enforcement Actions, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/monitoring-and-enforcement-actions

[https://perma.cc/6ASE-SD2H] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
164 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 604, 130
Stat. 122, 185-87 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2171(h)) (establishing the Interagency Center on
Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement).
165 It does most of this work through the Trade Policy Staff Committee. See Interagency
Role, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,

https://ustr.gov/about-us/interagency-role

[https://perma.cc/27SR-KXSC] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (noting that 20 agencies and offices
participate under USTR's oversight, reviewing hundreds of lawmaking documents each year);
see also Akhtar, supra note 107 ("Cabinet-level review on trade issues is through the Trade
Policy Committee (TPC).").
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otherwise behavior consistent with trade norms.1 66 In other words, USTR
reviews internationally facing regulations, speeches, and draft legislation
as part of its review process for not just trade-policy equities, but also

trade law violations or ambiguities.' 6 7
As shown above, multiple agencies across the trade administrative state
are involved in trade rulemaking, monitoring of foreign partners, and
enforcement, although they may take different forms in each agency. In
reviewing their work, USTR may effectively influence an agency to

change a rule in a way that may seem inconsistent with substantive
domestic law or administrative law procedures.1 68 For example, when
FDA makes a rule with foreign effect, like a foreign importer rule,16 9 or
when USDA makes organic regulations, typically USTR will note legal

concerns through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA") review process or directly and those concerns could prompt
change or further intra-agency dialogue.1

70

Third, USTR makes trade law through its enforcement of commitments
at the international level. USTR decides when to bring a case against

another country and under what conditions. These cases or dispute
settlement actions have occurred primarily at the WTO or under FTAs,

but the Trump administration relied upon domestic authorities also to

increase tariffs as a means of enforcing trade rules.171 USTR may choose

166 As noted by a U.S. General Accounting Office (today called
the Government

Accountability Office, GAO) study, USTR is mandated to "identify[] compliance problems,

set[] priorities, gather[] and analyze[] information, develop[] and implement[] responses, and
tak[e] actions." GAO-00-76, supra note 103, at 15-16.
167 You can see this increase in the number of attorneys rather than economists.
Id. at 18.
168 Much of this work is done behind the scenes but occasionally USTR's work with other
agencies in their rulemaking may come out in litigation as the other agencies note their
international trade law constraints. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric.,

613 F.3d 76, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2010) (in which the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

of USDA contextualizes its rulemaking within international trade law); Miss. Poultry Ass'n

v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1365, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), amended by, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993),
on reh'g, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (in which the Secretary of Agriculture's interpretation
of a standard was informed not just by the U.S. commitments under the World Trade
Organization but also under free trade agreement rules); Nat'l Coal Against the Misuse of

Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing changes in the
Environmental Protection Agency's rulemaking in light of international trade concerns).
169 See, e.g., Foreign Supplier Verification Programs for Importers of Food for Humans and

Animals, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,574 (Sept. 29, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
170 See Interview with USTR official (Nov. 10, 2020). This is one
of several interviews and
conversations carried out with USTR officials during research for this Article.
171 See Claussen, Trade's Security Exceptionalism,
supra note 14, at 1107.
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what cases to bring with political pressure and capacity limitations acting
as weak constraints.
USTR is not the only agency that has a role in applying and enforcing
U.S. trade law. 172 But USTR's piece is institutionally significant because

it has a trickle-down effect on so many other agencies and serves as the
last stop. Whatever USTR enforces with respect to trading partners abroad
has implications for domestic enforcers. USTR can even direct
appropriated funds, 173 and "draw upon the resources of' other agencies,

with their approval, to do so.' 74 The result is that other agencies, under
USTR's oversight, both determine the content of our trade policy and
175
implement it.

USTR's managerial functions have changed the shape of trade
governance from prior eras. Whereas in the trusteeship and agency eras,

trade governance was structured vertically both within and without the
executive branch, 176 the present trade administrative state is flatter, with
77
diagonal and round-about interactions.1 The organizational chart for
trade policy making shifted from vertical authority, streamlined within
the State Department, to scattered lines of authority in horizontal or
diagonal form.
Complicating matters further, all these actors engage both with foreign
countries and private interest groups. Individual agencies work directly
with their foreign counterparts, concluding legally binding agreements

172 Other enforcers of different aspects of trade law include CBP, Commerce, the ITC, and
the Court of International Trade ("CIT").
173 19 U.S.C. § 2171(e).
174 19 U.S.C. § 2171(f).
175 A 1934 congressional report described its intended delegation to the Executive as
"Congress Determines the Policy-The President Executes." H.R. Rep. No. 73-1000, at 14
(1934). Little today in trade policy follows that heading, which epitomizes how trade
governance worked in prior eras.
176

See, e.g., Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 435 fig.9.1.

177 Not even the GAO has a clear organizational chart to capture this engagement. It has

tried. Compare GAO-00-76, supra note 103, at 48-50 tbl.3 (table indexing lead responsible
agencies with reporting mechanisms) with U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-06-167,
USTR Would Benefit from Greater Use of Strategic Human Capital Management Principles
6 fig.1 (2000) (using a hierarchical chart to illustrate USTR organizational structure).
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and setting up institutions to manage cross-border commerce.'78 In a selfperpetuating cycle, Congress now regularly mandates interagency

committees given the increase in the number of agency stakeholders.'
The institutional contours have become exceedingly complex.'

79

80

Taken together, this model of trade administration creates a special
blend not accounted for in our executive governance models. 18 1 USTR
handles, directs, governs, and controls trade policy in action or use. It
combines a collection of authorities in both structure and substance:
delegated statutory authority like agency heads, delegated authority
directly

from

the President,

and

a

coordinating

function.

That

combination is distinct in the federal government.18 2 Whereas, for
example, CBP executes customs law mandates with virtually no policy-

oriented discretion, USTR has both considerable discretion and
leadership responsibilities-both de facto and de jure--consistent with
common understanding of "management." Through these tools, USTR
can precipitate both major changes in economic priorities for the nation

and seemingly small regulatory actions that have major impacts for
particular industries. As the gatekeeper for trade law and policy, given the
effects of tradification, this role extends far beyond major policies made

by the White House-it extends to everyday rulemaking by dozens of
agencies.

Seen in this light, and as a whole, USTR's functions are special and
underappreciated. The managerial trade administration model shifts the
central locus of authority one level down from seeing the President as the

178 See, e.g., Bureau of Int'l Labor Affs., U.S. Dep't of Labor, 15-2378-NAT, US and
Honduras
Sign
Landmark
Labor
Rights
Agreement
(Dec.
9,
2015),

https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ilab/ilab20151209 [https://perma.cc/GKE7-RGLQ].

179
113,

See, e.g., United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 116-

§§ 202A(b), 711, 134 Stat. 11, 34, 81 (2020) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4532).

'80 Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in

Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System 113,
122 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (asserting that one needs a diagram to
trace all the authorities of Section 301 that makes up an "intricate maze" with "extremely wide
loopholes"). Again, some commentators may find this to be precisely what was intended as
Congress built this system. The political economy literature has covered that territory well.
181 It is perhaps closest to a blend between the White House Office of Legal Counsel
and

the Office of Management and Budget-just trade-specific.
182 Cf. Pasachoff, supra note 7, at 2207-08 (describing how OMB controls policy making
through its budget process in ways somewhat similar to USTR's controls over trade-related

policy making).
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coordinator,1 83 where the agency has different operational controls.

Whereas the President can appoint and remove officials, and direct the
84
actions of administrators through his advisors,' USTR has developed a
different set of controls that directly and immediately has impacts on
private actors and foreign governments. In so doing, it exhibits both
executive and legislative functions. On the legislative side, USTR
develops U.S. trade policy and can choose the entirety of its direction
based on authorities delegated to it.' 85 On the executive side, USTR
conducts negotiations with other countries on topics related to
international economic matters.' 86 In neither structure nor content does
trade lawmaking fit with other models of domestic or international
lawmaking.
This is not to say that USTR controls every piece of U.S. trade policy;
there is a small handful of areas where USTR has very limited
influence.' 87 Further, leadership in trade lawmaking has sometimes
depended on personality.1 88 The relative strength of USTR versus
Commerce, Treasury, or individual members of the National Economic
Council or National Security Council has reflected the strength of
individual relationships with Congress or the White House. Given the
wide scope of trade lawmaking across the regulatory state, this should
come as no surprise. USTR's managerialism is necessarily incomplete as

I discuss in the next Section.
C. Incomplete Modelling

That USTR would become the trade law manager was not always
foreseen. Congress rejected other options for managing the trade
183 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 533, 546-52 (1989); Charles F. Bingman, The President as Manager of the
Federal Government, 35 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 146, 147-49 (1985).
184 Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape
of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1675, 1692 (2017).
18 That is, USTR can choose to impose tariffs or it can negotiate free trade agreements. See
Claussen, Trade's Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1163.
186 See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and China
Reach Phase One Trade Agreement (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2019/december/united-states-and-china-reach
[https://perma.cc/UAE2-DSTR].
181 See infra Section II.C.
188 See, e.g., Sylvan Lane, Five Key Players in Trump's Trade Battles, Hill (Aug. 20, 2019,
0
6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/458 16-five-key-players-in-trumps-trade30, 2021).
Jan.
visited
(last
battles [https://perma.cc/Z379-HTY9]
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administrative state over the years. 189 Nor is our trade-governance
experiment over. Periodic proposals on trade reorganization, as well as

newer debates over the balance of power on trade, have rekindled
congressional interest in examining U.S. trade functions. 190 In fact, in

nearly every administration, one finds proposals from both branches for
reconsidering how we do trade policy. 19 1 Some of these past proposals
may underestimate the myriad relationships now entrenched in the trade
administrative state.'92

Further, there are two areas of trade lawmaking that involve more
typical administrative law activities and appear to operate beyond the
reach of managerial administration.' 93 That is, rather than be subject to
USTR's oversight, monitoring, and enforcement, these areas of trade

lawmaking are subject exceptionally to judicial review and traditional
administrative processes in many respects. The first is in customs and
import processing; and, the second is trade remedies law involving the

ITC and Commerce, and ITC's work more generally. What sets each of
these apart from the rest of the trade administrative state is primarily a
robust review mechanism over each.

' Discussing one of these options, see Graham, supra note 108, at 230 n.41; see also I.M.
Destler, Making Foreign Economic Policy 213-14 (1980) (explaining why that option was not

viable).
190 See, e.g., Stuart E. Eizenstat, Unsettling a Delicate Balance, N.Y. Times, (June 19,
1983),
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/19/business/business-forum-unsettling-a-delicatebalance.html [https://perma.cc/AK7Y-MDT2].
191 See, e.g., id. (discussing attempts to change during the Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan
administrations); Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Proposal to
Reform,
Reorganize
and
Consolidate
Government
(Jan.
13,
2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/president-obamaannounces-proposal-reform-reorganize-and-consolidate-gov
[https://perma.cc/WZR6-

WWD8]; see also Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, It's Economic Strategy, Stupid, Am.
Affs. J. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/its-economic-strategy-

stupid/ [https://perma.cc/HX6Z-ZRCP] (noting that the Obama administration proposed
merging the Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, USTR, Export-Import
Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency).
192 Executive reorganizations are no longer legally facilitated, which has shifted pressure
within the White House to find other ways to make structural changes and to deal with

personalities. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox
Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1818-22 (2015).
193 There are also some smaller processes that do not envision a strong role for USTR like

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, especially if they were created
simultaneously with or before USTR's creation. Pub. L. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862).
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In the case of customs, USTR has very little control or oversight. At
the same time, CBP's role is largely executory and application-oriented.
As noted above, Congress often delegates implementation authority
directly to CBP. Perhaps most importantly, many of CBP's trade-related

operations are subject to review in the Court of International Trade
("CIT"). 194
Second, the trade remedies system is a complex administrative process
that likewise benefits from extensive judicial review. It allows private
parties to petition for duties that would counteract either import dumping
(selling at less than fair value) or foreign government subsidies.

Petitioners may seek this relief through a multi-step quasi-judicial process
carried out by the Commerce Department and ITC. Upon exhaustion of

administrative remedies, parties may also seek review by the CIT. More
generally, Congress sometimes makes executive action contingent on a

fording by the ITC. ITC, as an independent agency, is not subject to
195
USTR's direction, although USTR can request findings from the ITC.
Since 1974, the ITC budget-approval process is handled between the
agency and Congress and not OMB, enhancing its independence. The
1974 Trade Act also required the ITC to act in accordance with the

APA1 96 and that the ITC could order goods excluded rather than rely on
another agency to institute the order. This was the first time the ITC was
empowered to act directly with effect on private actors rather than just
recommend action.' 97 In these ways, the ITC has gradually increased its
authority and operates apart from USTR in most respects. Its early

factfinding work gave way to investigations with increased breadth as
early as the trade acts of 1922 and 1930. By 1958, it was hearing private

198 It is further
applications and granted wide subpoena powers.
exceptional in that it is among the few agencies that now carry out work
once carried out by Congress. Today, the ITC is far more than just the
99
"[n]ation's major source of information about international trade."'

194

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1581.
§ 201.7 (2020).

' See, e.g., 19 C.F.R.
196

Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,

§ 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053-54.

197 This empowerment was much slower than other empowerments of other commissions
which is why it is unusual-most could regulate, but not so with ITC until 1974. Tarullo, supra

note 113, at 581 & n.109.
198 John M. Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and Emergence of the U.S.
International Trade Commission 119 (1976).
199 Id. at 132.
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In sum, and largely as a result of their distinct histories, these aspects
of trade lawmaking do not exhibit the same qualities of managerial
governance. They are subject to their own independent reviews in their

trade administration activities which makes them useful touchpoints for
evaluating the distinctions underlying the rest of the system. Across the
remainder of the trade administrative state, USTR is the super-agency
with considerable oversight and control.
III. ASSESSING TRADE'S AGENCY & ITS AGENCIES

The above functional accounting of the modern trade administrative
state highlights an important change to a wide range of agencies as tradelawmaking actors with USTR as a key, often primary, manager. In

addition, in their trade lawmaking, those agencies often do not use nor are
they subjected to traditional administrative or judicial disciplines. This
turn to agencies with distinct internal and external processes has altered
the access points to trade policy making for external actors. Likewise, new

spaces for contestation have made agencies still more powerful players in
the trade-lawmaking story.
This Part turns to a normative assessment of our present managerial

trade administration. It addresses which institutions should have trade
administrative primacy, how much bureaucratization may be helpful or
harmful, and, most important, what types of process may be appropriate
within and outside of trade lawmaking in light of these features. The

executive and legislative branches have subscribed to the idea that the
USTR centralization mechanism is desirable, but we lack a theorization
of that choice. Here, I make the tentative case that there are some

constructive aspects of this mode of governance, including its
centralization and efficiency; nonetheless, I argue that three aspects of
managerial trade administration raise concerns: its lack of transparency,
lack of accountability, and its debatable legality. I begin with the costs of
our present mode of trade administration and then turn to the benefits.
A. The Costs of Modern Trade Administration
Compared to other potential modes of administration, managerial

agency administration exacerbates three routine administrative concerns.
First is the lack of transparency in the way USTR and other agencies

conduct their trade-lawmaking work. Second, there is a general lack of
accountability in this governance model considering the way USTR
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operationalizes its control mechanisms. Third, much of what occurs in the
200
modern trade administrative state is of questionable legality. Thus on
both process and positivist dimensions, our present trade administration
underperforms.
Concerns about transparency in our trade lawmaking are not recently
discovered nor are they unique to trade. Rather, for many years, civil
society advocates have expressed doubt about the secrecy through which
2 01
USTR and other agencies engage in rulemaking with other countries.
While trade policy details are known in broad brush strokes, there are
nevertheless many parts that remain hidden. The public is not privy to the
drafts, internal communications, or external negotiating positions during
the preparation of trade agreements or in other trade rulemaking. To

alleviate some of these concerns in 2015, Congress instituted a Chief
Transparency Officer position at USTR, although little more has been
202
made public.
Transparency issues likewise arise not just in rulemaking but also on

the monitoring and enforcement sides of trade lawmaking. Opaque
processes may prevent weak constituencies from ensuring that rules

relevant to them are enforced. 203 This is not a hypothetical. A 2019
Commerce Inspector General report raised concern about arbitrary
decision making by the Commerce Department in its handling of tariff
exclusion requests. 204 Further, in some instances, we do not know the
results of investigations that form the basis for subsequent trade
20
restrictions despite reporting requirements in certain agency statutes. s

200 These concerns bear some resemblance to the problems we see in other EOP super-

agencies. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 7, at 2250-71.

201 See, e.g., Patrice McDermott & Emily Manna, Secrecy, Democracy and the TPP: Trade

Transparency Is What the Public Wants-and Needs, Hill (Sept. 12, 2016, 7:30 AM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/295365-secrecy-democracy-and-

the-tpp-trade-transparency-is-what [https://perma.cc/2PA3-N7DG].
202 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-26, § 104(f), 129 Stat. 320, 342 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 4203). Some
members of Congress expressed concern that the role has been vacant during the Trump

administration. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Debbie Dingell, Dingell, Pascrell Demand
Increased Transparency at USTR (Mar. 29, 2018), https://debbiedingell.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1359 [https://perma.cc/RT2Y-YU5P].

Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 635.
Off. of the Inspector Gen., Dep't of Com., OIG-20-003-M, Management Alert: Certain
Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Section 232
Exclusion Request Review Process (2019).
203
204

205 See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Administration Won't Turn Over Auto Import Probe

Report,

Defying

Congress,

Reuters

(Jan.

21,

2020,

12:56

PM),
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Whereas the notice-and-comment process ought to give a public

window into rulemaking, there is not the same visibility in USTR's
monitoring role. For example, the scope and content of conversations

within interagency committees or in bilateral exchanges between agencies
are not publicly available. That USTR's monitoring role is heavily

focused on a legal analysis rather than policy equities may diminish
transparency concerns to the extent observers see legal analysis as more

objective, but we lack empirical evidence to fully evaluate such claims.
Across USTR's activities, it has a flexibility advantage but a transparency
problem.2 0 6

A second concern is that few of the processes or the substance of the
trade administrative state are subject to review or oversight that would
provide meaningful accountability. 207 There is little in place for any other
government actor or private actor to "demand an explanation . .. and to
reward or punish" USTR or other agencies based on their performance or
explanation. 208 These concerns align with other studies of the executive

branch, 2 09 but are exacerbated in trade administration by the lack of
congressional, judicial, or administrative backstops, which I will take up
in turn.

Whereas in the trusteeship or in the principal-agent model, Congress
could amend the already limited delegation or legislate over it to correct
missteps by the executive, 21 0 that remedy proves less curative in the

present model. Under present circumstances, given the entrenched nature
of the trade administrative state together with the breadth and scope of

congressional trade delegations to the executive, Congress no longer
https://www. reuters. com/article/us-usa-trade/trump-administration-wont-turn-over-autoimport-probe-report-defying-congress-idUSKBN1ZK2A1 [https://perma.cc/W86W-HYLV].
206 See David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International
Law, 46 Colum. J.

Transnat'1 L. 563, 565 (2008).

207 I draw here from Jerry Mashaw's foundational
work on the subject. See Jerry L. Mashaw,

Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in
Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 115, 121 (Michael W. Dowdle

ed., 2006).

208 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103

Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2135 (2005).

209 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative

State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 52 (2006).

This study provides additional support for the phenomena that Bressman and Vandenbergh
describe in their important work. For one, there is much more happening in OIRA review than
meets the eye.
2'0 And it did. For some examples, see Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note

115.
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retains control over small and large policy decisions. Managerial trade
administration distances policy-making choices and their resultant
outcomes from congressional review both as a result of statute and
practice. Further, while in prior governance models, the executive was
bound by various duties, those principles do not apply or exist in the
present construction. By comparison, other than the threat of limiting
appropriations, the most common oversight mechanism used by Congress

toward agency trade lawmaking is requiring agencies to consult with
21
Congress in a number of different ways. ' USTR's control mechanisms
become a substitute for supervision through legislative controls for other
agencies.
Most importantly, trade lawmaking suffers from limited judicial
review. 2 12 There are two principal difficulties that preclude robust judicial
213
review over major trade actions. The first is that some delegations are
214
still made to the President and subject to his discretion. Even though he
often subdelegates with respect to process, he has the final word, which
many have argued pulls these many trade decisions out of reach of
administrative disciplines. Under the APA, the President is not considered
an agency, and his decision cannot be challenged for arbitrary and
2 15
capricious decision making.
The second difficulty is, as noted above, that USTR in many aspects of
its rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement is itself likewise not subject
to the same accountability mechanisms as other agencies such as the APA
disciplines. Although USTR is engaged in making findings and taking

actions with an immediate impact on private persons, it is rarely
211 Missing from the literature is a comprehensive study of the congressional consultation

power-its scope, meaning, and implication. Other scholars have likewise noted its

prevalence. See, e.g., Lucas Issacharoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Implications of

the Cost of War, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 169, 185 & n.81 (2016) (discussing and citing sources on
congressional oversight in war powers as requiring consultation). In the case of USTR, this
responsibility primarily involves reporting to congressional committees. Different statutes
also provide for members of Congress to be designated congressional advisors, accredited to
advise USTR particularly with respect to negotiations. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, § 161, 88 Stat. 1978, 2008.
Colum. L. Rev.
212 See Frederick Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66
1428, 1459-60 (1966).
213 A third difficulty that I will take up further below in the context of reform is the challenge
of establishing standing.
2" As Davis puts it, it is "[p]residential button-pushing." Davis, supra note 212, at 1458.
2" Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 551; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that the President was not an "agency" within the meaning
of the APA).
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challenged and indeed whether USTR's actions are subject to judicial
review is a matter of debate. 216 That debate has not come to prominence,
until recently. Part of the question is rooted in the fact that the statutes

empowering USTR do not indicate that administrative law processes or
review should apply, nor do they normally create institutional support for

such mechanisms. 2 17 USTR is subject to some general statutes of
administrative law2 18 but its place under the APA is less clear and may be
action-specific. Although the APA includes a foreign-affairs exception,

courts have not determined conclusively whether USTR's activities

qualify for that exception.2 19 What is perhaps more important than

whether USTR's work actually is a matter of foreign affairs or a domestic
matter is that, when challenged, even if rarely, it can claim the APA

exception as a further means of shoring up its exemption from traditional
administrative law process.
In some instances, USTR has created new rulemaking processes on its
own or at the direction of the President-who himself has sometimes used
216 For a recent application, see Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United
States, 422 F. Supp.

3d 1255, 1281-83 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019).
21" Interestingly, it is more often the statutes that pre-date the APA that were amended to
refer to the APA than those that came after. But bear in mind again that only a fraction of
USTR's authority comes from statute. Where powers are subdelegated, presidents rarely
specify process. Courts may find determinative a difference between authorities for direct

action delegated to USTR by Congress, authorities subdelegated by the President, or
authorities for making recommendations to the President delegated by Congress. For example,

compare Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2141-42 (subdelegated
by President), and id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 2011-12 (delegated by Congress), with Tariff Act of
1930, Pub. L. No. 361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703-04 (delegated by Congress).
218 Under such generally applicable statutes as the Federal Records Act and the Freedom of
Information Act, USTR is considered an "agency." Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,
USTR Instruction 511.2, USTR Records Mgt. Program (2010) https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/gsp/speeches/reports/IP/ACTA/about%20us/reading%20room/USTR%
20lnstruction%20511-2%20Records%20Management%20Program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NBY5-VRGZ] (internal guidance recognizing USTR as an "agency" subject
to the Federal Records Act); Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, FOIA Reference Guide,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/reading-room/freedom-information-act-foia/foia-reference-guide

[https://perma.cc/CEC8-CT29] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (indicating that USTR is an
"agency" subject to FOIA requests).
219 Invenergy is one of the very few cases that has confronted the question at all. In a
preliminary injunction order and opinion in that case, Judge Katzmann concludes that
administrative law in its traditional tenets applies broadly to trade law, although it remains to
be seen how far this conclusion may stretch and what sorts of USTR rulemaking it sweeps in.

422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1288 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019). As Ganesh Sitaraman has noted, the
foreign-affairs exception is itself limited and agencies engaged in foreign-affairs work are still
subject to the APA's protections. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 Admin.

L. Rev. 489, 492-93 (2014).

896

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 107:845

the language of "notice and comment" without saying more-and without
220
On those recent occasions,
any statutory or regulatory guidelines.

USTR has employed ad hoc arrangements that it developed; some of those
arrangements take the form of applications, for example, that are

reviewed by USTR staff.22 1 In 2019-2020, USTR engaged in that sui
generis work at a large-scale level and now is facing related challenges
222
under the APA at the Court of International Trade.
A related issue has to do with the fact that USTR's activities do not fit
the traditional mold of those covered by the APA, nor has it grown into
using APA-like language as might have been anticipated as it
bureaucratized. Apart from one case discussing USTR's provenance,

there are only about two dozen cases in which USTR was a party in a nonFreedom of Information Act ("FOIA") proceeding and none of these takes
223
USTR is,
up institutional questions such as those at play in this project.

220

See Exec. Off. of the President, Memorandum of March 22, 2018: Actions by the United

States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099,

13,100 (Mar. 27, 2018).
for
221 See Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Procedures to Consider Requests

Exclusion of Particular Products From the Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301:
China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,

and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,181, 32,182 (July 11, 2018) (outlining the process for
requesting a product be excluded from proposed tariffs).
222 Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, China Section 301-Tariff Actions and Exclusion
3
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section- 01-investigations/tariff-actions
Process,
(listing numerous exclusions
2021)
19,
Apr.
[https://perma.cc/5Z3V-BEAA] (last visited
granted and extended). The Court of International Trade in a recent case decided that USTR's

withdrawal of an exclusion from tariffs imposed by the President under Section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974 was insufficient for administrative law norms. See Invenergy, 422 F. Supp.
3d at 1286-88. It left open the question of what process USTR ought to have used to
implement the exclusions in the first place.
223 Advanced search conducted in Westlaw using party name: "trade /5 representative,"

removing FOIA cases, and limiting results to reported cases using a Westlaw filter. Sample
cases found with this search include: Forest Stewardship v. USTR, 405 F. App'x 144, 146 (9th
Cir. 2010) ("Essentially, the best the Appellants hope for is that a judgment will somehow
encourage USTR to renegotiate the SLA with Canada, even though the court lacks the power
to direct the executive branch's conduct of foreign negotiations directly."); U.S. Ass'n of
Importers of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1344, 1350-51 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004) (granting a preliminary injunction against an interagency committee with

USTR only as one of several named defendants while noting only the "seriousness" of the
question whether the APA's rulemaking procedures applied to the committee), rev'd sub nom.
U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles & Apparel v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 413 F.3d 1344, 134546, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing on ripeness grounds and a failure to show likelihood of
success on the merits); Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (involving USTR, but only in relation to a presidential proclamation).
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therefore, uniquely positioned. Because it is less visible and its work
perceived to be mostly unreviewable, the current framework gives USTR
more authority and at the same time provides constituents with fewer

procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority.
The absence of clear APA protections means that exercises of tradelawmaking authority may not be subject to the same externally
legitimizing procedures as other areas of domestic regulation. In this way,

the managerial trade administration story qualifies longstanding scholarly

claims that Congress controls policy outputs through agency design. 2 4
This mode of executive governance also obscures which actor is

responsible for trade policy outcomes. Even at the level of trade law and
policy decisions, it can mask the true decider. By developing their own
norms for trade lawmaking, the executive actors in trade administration
reconfigure their own content, organizational, and procedural boundaries.
Finally, a third and most problematic concern has to do with the legality
of the entrenched norms at work in the trade administrative state.
Consistent with what public choice theorists would predict,22 5 we are
starting to see further expansion of trade lawmaking beyond statutory
mandates through unreviewable agency claims on inherent or unidentified

delegations. The lack of accountability and transparency contributes to
this concern. It is difficult to trace all that the agencies in the trade
administrative state are doing. Because trade lawmaking is not labeled as
rulemaking, not being published as such, otherwise being
exceptionalized, or not made public at all, the questionable legality of its
work cannot be challenged. 226

In the prior models, little commentary questioned whether the
executive was acting pursuant to congressional delegation; presidents

over the years made that clear. 227 Today, however, USTR and other
agencies regularly act under these unidentified authorities. For example,
224 See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 211,
259-61, 272-73 (2015)
(describing legal and political theories that support this claim).
221 See, e.g., Eamonn Butler, Public Choice-A Primer 88 (2012) (noting
public choice

theorists who formulated the theory that government bureaucrats have a strong interest in
expanding the size and scope of the government sector).
226 Even if USTR's actions were to be considered reviewable, many consider it futile to
challenge its decisions. Interviews with Trade Pracs. (Jan. 2020) (some even appear to fear
retaliation from the government). Beyond the scope of this Article is a further discussion to
be had about how trade lawmaking could influence what commentators mean by "rules." This
Article appropriates the term for its explanatory force, but its invocation may also have legal
force and therefore may be used selectively by advocates in this context.
227 See supra Part I.
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in 2020, USTR announced that it had negotiated an agreement with
Mexico according to which the United States will permit entry of grain-

oriented electrical steel from Mexico under certain conditions and Mexico

2 28
But in
will establish a monitoring regime for its exports of the same.

the course of making this announcement, USTR did not cite any authority
and the text of the agreement itself is not available for review. While
agreement through exchange of letters such as these is typical in the
practice of USTR,229 such letters are often expressly linked to the entry
into force of a trade agreement or come after the agreement is already in
force. Yet that was not the case with the announced agreement with
Mexico. These letters stand alone without any statute clearly providing
authority for the conclusion of the agreement between the two nations.
Accordingly, in making these trade executive agreements, USTR is acting

with at best thin legal basis. 230 This example is one of many in which
USTR's actions manifest only a weak, if any, statutory hook. As seen in

these types of actions, in this model, Congress does not share
23
responsibility in trade lawmaking, rather it is a mere "bystander."
Given the breadth of their administration and the delegations to them,
executive branch agencies in the trade administrative state decide with
considerable discretion what U.S. trade policy will be: discretion among
ends rather than merely means or conditions. Further, USTR has the
authority to set the agenda for trade lawmaking ultimately with legal
effect but in a manner that is often insulated from review.
Because modern trade administration involves considerable activity
beyond statutory delegations, it also distances the executive branch
farther

from

Congress

such

that

it,

ironically,

aggravates

the

accountability problem. In an administrative model that prioritizes one or
more agencies, Congress can evade, divest, and disassociate itself from
trade-lawmaking responsibility or claim to do so when politically

Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Statement on Successful
Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico (Nov. 5, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about228

us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/november/ustr-statement-successful-

conclusion-steel-negotiations-mexico [https://perma.cc/VC9W-Q4VK].

229 See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 33-34.
230 In other forthcoming work, I present original empirical research on more than 1,220
agreements of similar nature. Hundreds of trade executive agreements suffer from the same
questionable legality--but the present state of the law permits no challenge to their conclusion
and implementation. See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 7.
231 Hawkins & Norwood, supra note 77, at 86.
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convenient. 2 32 It can treat our international commitments as obligations

of the executive rather than of the United States. In this sense, a
managerial governance model may be ideal for Congress because this
way Congress can claim credit for successes and denounce failures. 233
Indeed, what I have described as a drawback here may be an advantage
in the eyes of certain members of Congress or certain private actors who
see this model as more easily accessible or subject to manipulation and
exploitation. 234
Having agencies

as custodians of process also provides some

distancing from the White House, but only so much as the heads of these
agencies are political appointees shaping policy for the President. 2 3

Nearly all the major trade acts in the second half of the twentieth century
established these processes either directly within agencies 236 or were so
moved by the President.237 This arrangement may risk conflict within the
bureaucracy and may create increased uncertainty, even if delegating

directly to agencies may have the benefit of making more easily
applicable the APA. 238 Likewise, informal and unsanctioned processes

modify the relative positions of the agencies vis-a-vis the President and
232 Id.

233 As it did with the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement. See Kimberly Ann Elliott,
Trump and Pelosi Both Claim Victory on the USMCA. Who Really Won?, World Pol. Rev.
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28451/trump-and-pelosi-bothclaim-victory-on-the-new-nafta-who-really-won [https://perma.cc/EH8P-3NRD].
234 For an example of easy manipulation, see the situation with the Section 232 tariff

exclusion process noted above. Lydia DePillis, How Trump's Trade War Is Making Lobbyists
Rich and Slamming Small Businesses, ProPublica (Jan. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM),

https://www.propublica.org/article/how-trump-trade-war-is-making-lobbyists-rich-andslamming-small-businesses [https://perma.cc/T786-DY5S]. I have not taken up here questions
of accessibility which are among the non-transparent aspects of USTR's work, but which may
benefit certain actors.
233 Some have said that the statutory language today still permits action against "virtually
any trade practice the USTR wishes to attack." Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats
in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Pol'y

Int'l Bus. 263, 306 (1992).

236 Notably, while Congress could legislate to restrict this type of movement or to re-assign

these authorities, it rarely does so.
237 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999) (setting
policy
to do environmental reviews); Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,721 (Apr. 5, 2017)
(calling for a report on deficits); Exec. Order No. 13,601, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,981 (Mar. 5, 2012)
(creating the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center); Exec. Order No. 13,785, 82 Fed. Reg.

16,719 (Apr. 5, 2017) (establishing enhanced collection of anti-dumping and countervailing
duties); Exec. Order No. 13,796, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,819 (May 4, 2017) (dictating how every
trade agreement should uphold certain principles).
23 See Tarullo, supra note 81, at 317-18
n.114.
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Congress. This model also chances unevenness where trade lawmaking
may be managed loosely in some areas and managed stringently in others.
Managerial trade administration has a concealed normativity that
privileges actors and values in dominant institutions over traditional

administrative assets.
B. Unexpected Virtues

The greatest and perhaps most obvious and intended advantage of
managerial trade administration is its coordination. USTR usefully
develops a single and consistent policy across a sprawling trade

administrative state.23 9 A unilateral and single voice on trade is critical to
internal and external relationships. Rather than have each agency resolve
trade law consistency determinations on its own, USTR can ensure that
240 This arrangement
the United States speaks with one voice on trade.
could have a bolstering effect where agencies are able to work together
toward the same goal, therefore ensuring or shoring up trade law content
and its execution. At its best, this coordination provides value not just to
the President in seeing that the laws are faithfully executed and to
Congress in implementing legislative policies that Congress could never
carry out itself, but also to the many market actors that operate in the trade
space.

Tradification makes coordinated regulation more challenging. On the

24
one hand, Congress is not positioned to micromanage trade. ' Big trade
242
are likely impractical for the
agreements that take years to negotiate

239

This "single responsible authority" concept has been hailed as an improvement. Stanley

D. Metzger, Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round 92 (1964). For the same point in the

OIRA context, see Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence,
81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 613 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1841-42 (2013). These
positive accounts have led some scholars to call for an expansion or extension of OIRA-type
agencies. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch, 128 Harv.
L. Rev. F. 64, 65 (2015).
240 The foreign relations literature is rife with one-voice doctrine analyses. See, e.g., Sarah

H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One-Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 Vill. L. Rev.
975, 979 (2001) (describing "[t]he 'one-voice' doctrine" as "a familiar mantra of U.S. foreign
relations jurisprudence"). As I point out below, having USTR at the center helps, but it is
insufficient to ensure that the United States speaks with just one voice in its foreign
engagements-in some ways, it has the opposite effect. A more horizontal trade landscape
means more agencies are engaged in diagonal rulemaking.
241 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928).
242 Caroline Freund & Christine McDaniel, How Long Does It Take To Conclude a Trade
Agreement with the US?, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ. (July 21, 2016),
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speed at which the global economy is moving. The diagonal relationships
between agencies and their foreign counterparts are more multifaceted
than previously appreciated with respect to the breadth of countries
involved and the scope of topics. Multiple agencies now develop bilateral
agreements-large and small-to regulate trade and few of those
agreements are publicly known or reported to Congress. 243 In this sense,

working through and with USTR has the advantage of better keeping track
of those various connections. 244

To be sure, USTR's coordination as trade law manager is not perfect.
Agencies

sometimes

move

forward

without USTR's

consent

or

complicate trade policies by taking action in other areas of foreign
relations. 245 For example, CBP and Commerce sometimes apply different

standards on the basis of the same statute. 24 6 Within the trade
administrative state, agencies approach similar or related problems with

different tools and in so doing have differing priorities. But in the absence

https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/how-long-does-it-take-concludetrade-agreement-us [https://perma.cc/VAP2-GJKJ].
243 For an elaboration and list of these agreements, see Claussen, supra note
115. For one
illustration: the USDA, together with USTR, negotiated details around trade in sheep offals

with China-directly and without congressional review. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Economic
and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of

China

Fact

Sheet:

Agriculture

and

Seafood

Related

Provisions

4

(2020),

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Phase_One_
Agreement-AgSummaryLongFact Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCK9-G9ND]; see also
Lighthizer: China Deal Will Be an Executive Agreement, Not Submitted to Congress, Inside

U.S. Trade (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://insidetrade.com/trade/lighthizer-china-dealwill-be-executive-agreement-not-submitted-congress [https://perma.cc/KSQ8-XES3] (noting
lack of congressional review).
244 USTR compiles these in an annex to its annual report. See 2019 Annual Report, supra

note 102, Annex

II.

245 The Section 232 investigations by the Commerce Department are one example. The
statute provides no role for USTR and indeed the steel and aluminum Section 232
investigations began before Ambassador Lighthizer was confirmed by the Senate. See Jacob
M. Schlesinger & Natalie Andrews, Senate Confirms Robert Lighthizer as Trump's U.S.
Trade Representative, Wall St. J. (May 11, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senateconfirms-robert-lighthizer-as-trumps-u-s-trade-representative-1494529048

[https://perma.cc/TD6Q-KC6R]; Bureau of Indus. & Sec. Off. of Tech. Evaluation, U.S. Dep't
of Com., The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security 18 (2018),
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/stee2224-the-effect-of-imports-of-steel-onthe-national-security-with-redactions-20180111/file [https://perma.cc/AEC6-MA3H] (noting

the246232 investigations began in April 2017).

Interview with Trade Prac., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 2019). These differences can be
seen in the jurisprudence of the Court of International Trade. Id.
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of such a central figure, the trade administrative state might face much
greater fragmentation.

Further, not everything in the trade administrative state is harmonious.
2 47
On other
Sometimes USTR will disavow the work of other agencies.
occasions, it may not be aware of agency activities despite close
coordination. For instance, agency competition between USTR and the

Commerce Department in the Trump administration created an east-west
divide, pitting the east side of the White House (where USTR's office is
located) against the west (where the Commerce department is located).
This infighting is not new nor is the attempt at ending it. As early as 1934,

conflict between the Secretary of State and the trade advisors in the White
248
House put the finalization of a trade agreement in question. USTR does
249 but this structure
not have the last word on all trade-related matters,
provides a streamlining effect.
A second easily discernable benefit of the managerial model is the
flexibility it brings compared to prior models. It provides some degree of
efficiency and dynamism. It allows the executive to change policies as
necessary in response to domestic and international pressures where

increased congressional oversight would prove problematic. Principal25 0
or create excessive constraints
agent relationships can limit innovation

that may push the President and his collaborators to seek to manage trade
relationships in other ways. A more flexible system such as the current

247 U.S.-China Trade: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 116th Cong. (2020)
(testimony of Robert Lighthizer, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Lighthizer
Testimony] (repeating that the Section 232 national security tariffs were not in "[his] lane").
248 See Hawkins & Norwood, supra note 77, at 93-95 (discussing the Hull-Peek controversy
in 1934 in which Peek, a special advisor on foreign trade, negotiated an agreement with

Germany for cotton but Secretary Hull urged the President to disapprove); see also Ellery C.
Stowell, Editorial Comment: Secretary Hull's Trade Agreements, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 280, 283

(1935) (discussing allocation of power between State and Commerce).
249 See, e.g., Sabrina Rodriguez, Lighthizer, Mnuchin and Liu Play Telephone, Politico
2
(Nov. 26, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/
72
7 83

019/

0

[https://perma.cc/TM2G-MA9T];
11/26/lighthizer-mnuchin-and-liu-play-telephoneDamian Paletta, Top Trump Trade Officials Still at Odds After Profane Shouting Match in
Beijing, Wash. Post (May 16, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2018/05/16/top-trump-trade-officials-still-at-odds-ater-profane-shoutng
match-in-beijing/ [https://perma.cc/F5ZJ-DC63]; Logan Pauley, Consistent Inconsistency
Crippling Trump's China Trade Ambitions, Hill (May 31, 2018, 8:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/390085-consistent-inconsistency-crippling-trumps-china-

trade-ambitions [https://perma.cc/7YNX-8A9S].
this
250 Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, supra note 1, at 326 (describing how
occurs in trade).
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one can be more responsive and assertive to correct and address trading
partner or market anomalies. For these reasons, lawmakers rejected
proposals to reorganize the trade administrative state by putting USTR in

Commerce.2 51 In the 1980s, when these discussions were at their height,
commentators warned of making USTR too large a bureaucracy that

might lead to its developing turf concerns.2 52
A third benefit that relates to the flexibility piece is that trade
administration in its present construction relieves pressure from other
trade-lawmaking access points. It alleviates concerns about congressional

logrolling. Indeed, much of the evolution of at least some aspects of trade
lawmaking has had to do with controlling interest group capture,

establishing channels of communication and delegation between the
branches, and balancing bureaucratic expertise with market-driven
agenda setting.2 53 The methods of information gathering and inputs to the

trade-lawmaking process are therefore critical to outcomes. As agencies
have taken on greater roles and developed their own processes for
rulemaking, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement, these access
points for industry and the public have only grown in importance.
A fourth and the most surprising benefit of trade managerialism is its
trade law compliance-enhancing effect. 5 4 Having a super-agency at the

2 Eizenstat, supra note 190 (noting that the administration's
reorganization proposal
"would weaken and even further fragment trade policy" putting USTR in a "bulky Commerce
Department bureaucracy," and that the USTR's "most important asset" is direct access to the
President).
252 USTR cannot be "both a trade advocate and an interagency
coordinator." Id.
25 Additional work is needed to unpack where the expertise should
be and where and how
coherence may be valuable in trade institutional design. Administrative law scholars have long
studied issues related to capture and expertise. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule,
Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 94 (2008)
(explaining that the Supreme Court has considered whether an administrative actor utilized
their expertise in deciding whether to apply Skidmore deference); Steven P. Croley,

Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government 3-4 (2008)

(arguing administrative procedures help to insulate agencies against capture). But see Wendy
E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321,
1325 (2010) (arguing that transparency requirements in the rulemaking process without proper
filtration of information have facilitated what she calls "information capture"-where wellresourced parties inundate regulators with information as a means of influencing them). Little
of this work has extended these explorations to traditional trade domains.
24 This is a flip side of administrative scholars' critique of OMB and OIRA
as selective.
See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1266-69 (2006) (criticizing OIRA for its overly narrow focus

on regulatory costs); Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 209, at 92-96 (critiquing OIRA's
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center of our trade law apparatus with commanding effect may enhance
the likelihood of compliance or at least awareness of the terms of
compliance with international trade rules. Indeed, USTR's management

is at its most directive when it acts as a monitor with respect to the work
of other agencies. As each agency develops its cross-border regulation,
USTR ensures that that regulation is consistent with U.S. international
trade law commitments to avoid risk of litigation at the WTO or under
free trade agreements. This role goes far beyond that of OMB or other
EOP agencies.2 ss USTR is not just a gatekeeper to policy making but also

reinforces international law norms.
Although the State and Defense Departments oversee their own
activities, rarely do they monitor other agencies in a police-like role as
USTR does. Even in other areas of international economic law, most U.S.

256
This
agencies are responsive rather than preemptory as USTR is.
law-enhancing
international
of
kind
managerial system creates a different

"transmission belt" than we have seen before in U.S. cross-border
2
governance or in other parts of the regulatory state.

1

Importantly, at this

moment during our trade war, when critics raise concern about the
President's disfavor of international trade law and institutions, this study
reveals that USTR's control over trade lawmaking is entrenched enough
to counteract those concerns.
In this respect, managerial trade administration is process-trumping but
international-law-enhancing. The law-enhancing effect makes trade law
an administrative process control. It privileges substance over process but
nevertheless serves as a control mechanism over agency rulemaking in
the same way that APA disciplines do. The result of modern trade
administration lacking in process but gaining in compliance makes this

area of lawmaking a ripe case study for further research in administrative
law more generally.
lack of transparency, selectivity, and narrow focus on costs based on interviews with agency
officials who have participated in OIRA review). USTR's review is legalized in contrast.
255

As Tom Merrill has noted, "to allow the EOP to displace the myriad agencies by

becoming the 'decider' would weaken legal constraints on administrative action, and deprive

affected interests and individuals from having an effective voice in the implementation of
regulatory policy." Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of
Administrative Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1953, 1979-80 (2015).
256 See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 104, at 212-16 (describing the role of the Treasury
Department in international economic lawmaking shaping policies as needed in coordination
with international organization).
257 On the longstanding transmission belt idea in administrative law, see Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1675 (1975).
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This qualified appraisal of modern trade administration yields mixed
results. On the one hand, we gain advances in certain areas that may be
particularly important to policy makers, but on the other, we may lose

values central to administrative law theory and practice over the last fifty
years. The next Part turns to the prescriptions for both trade and

administrative law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS & FUTURE EXPERIMENTS

The development of trade law through a trade administrative state
augments and in significant respects subordinates other modes of trade
law governance, including modes that other participants expected and
directed to play a substantial role such as the international legal
framework that governs most of global trade. In this Part, I examine the

implications of the new phenomenon for ongoing structural and doctrinal
debates related to but beyond traditional understandings of trade law. This
preliminary review is intended to lay the groundwork for further research.

I turn here to the implications of this unexplored area for three issue areas
or ongoing debates: first, for our understanding of foreign relations law
and policy; second, for the perhaps ill-fated scholarly ambition for a

constitutionally balanced regime; and third, for shaping future modes of
administrative law.
When one views trade lawmaking as an administrative program instead

of one driven primarily by international law or our constitutional regime,

the prescriptive challenges quickly crystallize. Trade scholars have

focused on the separation of powers when more work has been needed on
how it is that trade law lacks the guarantees that we have come to expect
of a traditional administrative law system since the middle of the
twentieth century.

The next phase of our trade governance experiment depends on how
actors address these deficits. The managerial model need not be the only
way to administer U.S. trade law going forward. Here I consider other

ways and show that this project has lessons both for trade policy makers
and for administrative law scholars, as well as for auxiliary literatures
from which it draws, including constitutional and foreign relations laws.
I begin with the latter before turning to how the challenges of trade
administration resound to administrative law.
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A. Confronting Trade's Intermesticity

This study has implications not just for how the law treats trade but
also about how we treat trade in the law. Should we think about trade as
a domestic regulatory matter or as an international or foreign affairs
matter? What are the implications of that choice for internal process
rather than for organizational design? Is trade lawmaking more like treaty
making where there is not a lot of oversight, or is it more like traditional
regulations where process-focused norms emphasize the need for noticeand-comment opportunities? Better understanding the project of trade
administration brings into stark contrast the question as to whether or how

to think about trade under the heading of foreign affairs, and vice versa.

25 8
has
Having thought about it as subject to a foreign-affairs paradigm

likely affected the scrutiny with which we have approached trade
lawmaking.

Trade lawmaking undoubtedly has some distinct features as described
in Part II, but those ought not to suggest that the normal regulatory

oversight mechanisms do not apply or that trade-focused agencies ought
not to share the same values as those of other agencies, especially those
engaged in foreign affairs. The difficulty is that while other parts of
2
foreign relations may have been normalized in U.S. law, 11 that has not
been the case for trade. Trade has been only selectively normalized.
One consequence of trade's role in both domestic and foreign practice
together with its general neglect by domestic doctrines is that, in practice,
trade can claim foreign-affairs disciplines when convenient. When other
domestic authorities do not serve to support trade lawmaking, trade actors
have claimed that the President is acting on his inherent authority
regarding foreign affairs. 260 They have relied on a foreign-affairs
exception to the APA where USTR's actions have come under judicial
review. 261 They assert that secrecy and non-transparency are required in

international negotiations and rulemaking when they make trade law

See generally Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 598-601.
See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law,
128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897, 1919-24 (2015).
260 See Lighthizer Testimony, supra note 247, at 18-19; Brief of Defendants-Appellees at
16-17, Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No.
19-1727).
261 Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1288-89 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2019).
258
259
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rules. 262 They also claim foreign-affairs authority exempts them from
congressional approval for certain trade agreements. A good example of

the latter occurred when Ambassador Lighthizer informed Congress that
he would not be sharing drafts of agreements with China or Japan with
congressional committees because the Constitution permitted the
President to act subject to his inherent foreign-affairs authority. 263
On the other hand, trade law agencies opt out of foreign-affairs
restrictions when convenient. For instance, domestic rules under what is
known as the Case Act require agencies to report international agreements

and to adhere to certain protocols administered by the State
Department. 264 By claiming to be excepted from the rest of the foreignaffairs apparatus, actors in the trade administrative state are able to
undertake international trade engagements without coordinating with
other foreign-facing elements of the U.S. government. This
differentiation works against the coordination that USTR facilitates:

while the United States is able to speak with one voice on trade, those
actions may not be coordinated with the rest of our foreign policy,
managed primarily by the State Department. These distinctions challenge

the foreign affairs "one-voice" doctrine. 26 Given its various mandates,
USTR is able to choose between domestic or foreign affairs-including
national security-doctrines as they suit what USTR perceives as the need
of the moment. 266

Questions about trade's "foreign affairs-ness" and the contributions of
the trade administrative state to foreign relations law are related to another
ongoing debate among scholars and practitioners that asks: if we think

foreign affairs is a separate track in constitutional or administrative law,
then where does trade fit? This question which is indirectly before the
courts in various nondelegation and other challenges now underway2 67
may belatedly force a determination on trade's doctrinal home. At the

262 Doug Palmer, Secrecy Needed in Trade Talks: USTR Kirk, Reuters
(May 13, 2012, 1:56

PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-kirk-idUSBRE84CAQ20120513
[https://perma.cc/TZ9G-CU4J].

263 Lighthizer Testimony, supra note 247, at 18-19.
264 The Case-Zablocki Act (Case Act for short) requires executive
branch agencies to report
their international agreements to Congress through the State Department. 1 U.S.C. § 1 12b.
265 See Cleveland, supra note 240, at
979.

266 See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees at
20, Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States,
806 Fed. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1727).
267 See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States, 806 F.
App'x 982, 988-89 (Fed. Cir.
2020).

908

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:845

time of USTR's creation, these institutional changes were seen as

"radically alter[ing]" the way the United States conducted its "broader
foreign policy" because it would allow USTR to "control other important
2 68
segments of U.S. foreign relations."

Trade's foreign-affairs selectivity (and foreign affairs' trade
selectivity) is counterintuitive when seen through the lens of foreign
relations literature that considers as one of normalization's features a shift
from exceptional constitutional law to ordinary administrative law and
statutory

69
Trade
interpretation arguments.2

is probably

the most

administratively heavy of all foreign affairs and yet, it is considered
functionally, institutionally, and methodologically distinct. Right now,
trade law evades on both grounds. When it is a matter of an APA
challenge, USTR or other trade-administering agencies can claim a
foreign relations exception. When the Case Act or other foreign relations

disciplines are invoked, they can claim domestic or sui generis status.
This benefit is afforded trade lawmakers in part as a result of trade's
intermesticity: its part domestic, part international character, although this

study shows just how much the relevance of domestic doctrines has been
neglected. 270
Debates in foreign relations law have adhered largely to questions of
text, structure, and history to the exclusion of trade administrative
27 1
activities and possibly to both bodies' detriment. But the foreign-affairs
doctrines and literature are not the only bodies that miss the mark on trade.
B. Regime Shifting
A further lesson for scholarship and practice from this analysis is that
the quest for balance in our separation of trade law powers may not be the
most productive approach. This project seeks to shift the positioning of

trade law from constitutional to administrative territory to reflect better
the actual exercise of trade lawmaking. There, agencies are not competing
against one another but are instead part of a complex organizational
structure that administers trade policy. And the power of the agencies is
tempered by the presence of an agency manager. These are institutional
arrangements that our constitutional account too often misses-where
268 Graham, supra note 108, at 235.
269 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 259, at 1901.
270 Tim Meyer has discussed the dangers of disjunctions in our trade law. See Timothy
Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 151, 154-55 (2020).

271 See Sitaraman, supra note 219, at 492.
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executive branch agencies make trade policy in the interstices of statutory
delegations.
Scholarly attempts to grapple with trade governance have fallen along

several general lines but nearly all focus on the constitutional separation
of powers. Some commentators have considered that there ought to be a
better "balance" between Congress and the executive on managing trade
policy and have addressed that directly, while others focus on substantive
outputs and regulatory aspects of trade law as a general or subject-specific

matter.2 7 2 They frequently call for Congress to "take back" its authority
or "restore" its trade power. 273 These works undoubtedly help discern the
nature of the separation of powers, but ultimately pay insufficient

attention to the myriad ways the executive alone implements and
administers trade law. Formalists may think that trade administration
blends powers inconsistently with the Constitution. But that view equally
obscures all the work that agencies are doing as a matter of practice. In
short, despite the lack of literature reviewing the specifics of the executive
branch's involvement in trade lawmaking, trade and foreign relations
commentators have perceived there to be a tipped balance that ought to

be corrected.
I submit that commentators have been asking the wrong question. It is
not about what is the appropriate balance between the branches or about
bi-branch institutional design, but rather, given the entrenched practicedriven ecosystem that has emerged, more about examining appropriate
procedural schemes. Constitutional balancing exercises tend to emphasize
272

See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 47, 239-68 (2009) (broadly re-balancing in foreign

affairs including trade). Important recent contributions in the latter category include: Timothy
Meyer, Local Liability in International Economic Law, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 261, 269 (2017)
("[D]irect liability for subnational governments should replace strict vicarious liability and
immunity in international economic law."); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate

(Cooperatively), 38 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 1, 8 (2016) ("[W]hen it comes to food safety, the harms
caused by regulatory pluralism outweigh the benefits."); Gregory Shaffer, Alternatives for
Regulatory Governance Under TTIP: Building from the Past, 22 Colum. J. Eur. L. 403, 40304 (2016) (proposing six alternative paradigms to evaluate negotiations over the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership).
273 See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Opinion, The President Has Too Much Power Over on Tariffs.
Congress Should Reclaim That Authority., Wash. Post (June 14, 2019, 3:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/14/president-has-too-much-power-overtariffs-congress-should-reclaim-that-authority/
[https://perma.cc/88DQ-BD6Y];
Glenn

Altschuler, How Congress Can Take Back Control Over Tariffs, Hill (June 2, 2019, 12:30
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/446513-how-congress-can-take-back-control-overtariffs [https://perma.cc/3SYX-B75Z]; Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority
Over Tariffs, supra note 4.
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the same limits: classifying some activities as clearly legislative or clearly
executive,274 while trade-lawmaking exercises are structurally or
practically shared. In trade law governance, as a matter of historical
practice, as opposed to doctrinal, structural, or textual foundation, the
executive branch has developed a trade administration cemented in an
elaborate institutional design that, despite its prior evolution, is now
politically and practically hard to change.
Accordingly, this Article is not intended as a roadmap to reform or
rebalancing. The answer to these well-intended concerns, I submit, does

not lie in rectifying constitutional doctrine at all but rather in the
acquisition of a fuller understanding of the trade administrative state and
trade law managerialism that may precipitate a better theory of and
process for trade lawmaking over time. Thus, this study yields lessons for
policy makers interested in shifting the pendulum in other directionssuch as toward the promise of administrative law disciplines in this space.
At present, administrative law disciplines face a figurative wall in their
application to trade lawmaking in light of particularly three issues:
constitutional

ambiguity,

discretionary

authority,

and

statutory

multiplicity. Each of these makes trade-relevant administrative law
difficult. First, the constitutional ambiguity in trade authority allows trade
2 75
actors to claim foreign affairs and inherent Article II authority, making
it appear as though any statutory claim that an agency such as USTR is

acting ultra vires is unlikely to be successful. Courts have waffled on what
is justiciable among trade law which may have created a perception that
27 6
certain trade law decision making is not subject to review. Second, the
vast discretionary authority granted to the President, the USTR, and other
trade actors impedes the application of administrative disciplines. Many
of the statutes that result in trade action put ultimate discretion in the
hands of the President and therefore out of reach of review even if the
274 See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1169, 1230 (2019) (arguing that "executive power" was

originally understood as "a discrete subset of... substantive authorities").
275 See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 1, 5, Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States,

806 Fed. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1727).
276 Compare Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States, No. 10-37, 2010 WL 1409656, at
*1-*3 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 4, 2010) (concluding that the CIT lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to review the Softwood Lumber Agreement because plaintiffs did not present
sufficient evidence that the agreement was negotiated under Section 301) with Invenergy

Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1263-70 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019)
(concluding that the CIT had jurisdiction under Section 201 to review USTR's withdrawal of
its prior exclusion of a product from safeguard duties).
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agencies and particularly USTR is doing the work. 277 Third, the multitude

of relevant trade statutes has led to disorganization and exacerbates the
lack of awareness by Congress of what is happening, leaving many

organically developed processes in place without making them subject to
challenge. Few practitioners have tested USTR authorities in the courts
over the years, although the reason for their not doing so remains
unclear. 278 Relatedly, despite that the President frequently uses executive
orders to create trade subdelegations, there is no overarching guidance
like in Executive Order 12866 setting up regulatory review for the OMB

and OIRA 27 9 which has meant there is little guidance as to the boundaries
of USTR's authority. 280 Much of what USTR and other trade-related
agencies do has developed or evolved organically through practice
making it difficult to identify what law applies. 281
Trade lawmaking in the interstices of congressional statutes and

delegations occurs in administrative law's blind spot. And yet,
administrative law is intended to superimpose a legal framework on a
political process and to mediate an uneasy relationship among the
branches. Administrative law applies to the ongoing operation of

government bodies and seeks to shape official decisions that impact
businesses and citizens throughout society. 282 But in trade, as a result of
both statute and doctrine, administrative law's constraints are somewhat
absent.2 83
Given

these

constraints,

it

should come

as

no

surprise

that

administrative law scholarship likewise does not engage deeply with trade
administration. Administrative and constitutional law experts have long
277 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2251 ("[T]he President ... shall take all appropriate and feasible
action ... which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to
make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social
benefits than costs.").
278 Interviews with Trade Pracs. (Jan. 2020) (commenting that they do not believe USTR's
actions qualify for APA review). But see infra text accompanying note 286.
279

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).

280 Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation
in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 441, 453-56 (2010) (reviewing presidential

administration and the roles of OMB and OIRA).
281 See Claussen, supra note 115, at 3 (describing agency
practice).

282 See Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law: The United States
and Beyond, in

International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Sciences 109 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed.
2015).
283 See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319-20 (11th Cir
2001) (finding the question whether NAFTA was appropriately concluded as a congressionalexecutive agreement to be a "nonjusticiable political question").

912

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:845

lamented what appears to be congressional abdication to the President

with the growth of the regulatory state. A burgeoning literature on
executive authority that does not need to be rehearsed here finds benefits
284
in an unbound executive while also warning of its dangers. Oddly, that
literature has not explored in detail the problems and puzzles posed by
trade administration. 285 It is remarkably light on trade administration
today, how it has evolved, and what that might mean for the
administrative law enterprise. That is not to say that trade law and
administrative law have not influenced each other. Administrative law
applies readily to trade law and trade lawmaking as can be seen in the
jurisprudence of the CIT. The CIT ordinarily hears several hundred cases
each year. 286 In nearly 70 percent of these cases, the CIT is called upon to

adjudge whether CBP, the ITC, or the Commerce Department acted
consistently with a trade statute or with the procedural requirements of
the APA. 287 Administrative law is the backbone of the CIT when it comes
to the activities of these three agencies. Still, few scholars have taken up
28 8
In sum, while
the larger trends or issues in trade administration.
on how best
issues
pragmatic
with
administrative law debates have dealt
and true to
times
to develop processes that are both "effective for modern
the Constitution's commitment to checks and balances,"289 little of that

284 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the

Madisonian Republic 5 (2011) (arguing that while there is no guarantee that an unbound
executive will "pursue the public interest," there is also "no pragmatically feasible alternative"

and that "politics and public opinion .. . block the most lurid forms of executive abuse").
Rights for
285 Outdatedly, see William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment
99
Response,
No
Need,
Heightened
Trade:
International
Affecting
Administrative Decisions
Yale L.J. 669 (1989); Davis, supra note 212; George Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a
Regulatory Agency, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1961).
286 In fiscal year 2018, 242 new cases were filed with CIT. U.S. Cts., U.S. Court of
International Trade--Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods
Ending September 30, 2017 and 2018, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data tables/jb_gl0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMY9-KTGP].
287 Id. Exceptionally, in autumn 2020, more than 3600 complaints were filed at the CIT

against USTR for its Section 301 activities. See Standard Procedure Order, In Re Section 301
Cases, No. 21-01 (U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade, 2021).

288 Existing accounts are dated. Frederick Davis and Daniel Tarullo each penned their

reviews of trade administrative concerns in 1966 and 1986 respectively. See Davis, supra note
212; Tarullo, supra note 81. That there is such a dearth is surprising given that some of the

most important administrative law and nondelegation cases from the twentieth century are

related to trade law (e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)).
289 Sitaraman, supra note 219, at 496-97.
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process-oriented conversation has covered trade. Rather, it has missed a
lot of actual administration in practice. 290
Orienting our thinking toward managerial trade administration
manifests lessons for administrative law that are worth surfacing for
further consideration. The trade administration experience maps on to
administrative theory in multiple ways. And, in certain respects, it turns

some administrative law theories on their heads. For one, traditional
normative debates among the administrative law literature do not overlay
well where administrative law's premises cannot be assumed. What trade
may show is that our concepts of administrative law are overgeneralized
and more nuance may be needed. 291
An additional lesson is that non-traditional administrative practices
may become entrenched in the absence of administrative norms and that
is difficult to undo. Trade represents an area in which substitutes have
arisen and now are regularly practiced. Since there is no back-up or
default administrative law for these types of systems, they have developed
largely without it. Additional scholarship on how to address these
overlooked elements of our regulatory systems would be helpful.
Similarly, looking at trade through an administrative law lens uncovers

areas of nuance that again are lacking in the literature. The trade story
suggests a spectrum of administrative law models from thin to thick. It is

not a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation in the executive branch.
Rather, administrative law must adapt its norms to particular areas of law

that require more or less of each, but we lack a deeper understanding of
the greater implications of the spectrum.
C. Trade Administration's UnfinishedBusiness
Notwithstanding this state of play, administrative law holds promise as

a way to defend against problems of non-transparency and lack of
accountability in trade lawmaking. Achieving and maintaining such a
system is no simple task. How, under this structure, do we guarantee the
disciplines that meet our normative expectations? Given that
290 David Zaring makes this point, relying on
earlier work by Jerry Mashaw. See Zaring,
supra note 104, at 194.
291 For a broader critique of this point, see Emily S. Bremer, The Exceptionalism
Norm in

Administrative Adjudication, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1351, 1352-53 (2019) (arguing that, in
agency adjudications, "Congress and individual agencies have ... create[d] unique
adjudicatory proceedings designed to meet the individual needs of different administrative
agencies and programs").
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administrative law is not doing the job that it should and that many assume
it already does in trade, what changes could be made? How could trade
administration be made better subject to disciplines that are necessary to
achieve the goals embedded in normal administrative law? Or, what will
post-managerial trade administration look like? This model is dynamic by
nature, even if it is structurally entrenched. We have an opportunity now
2 92
to rethink its procedural form and content.
Although the potential menu of options involves all sorts of
possibilities both to enhance and enable productive trade policy, some are
more likely to be realized than others. Further, rather than emphasize
"balance" in a traditional checks and balances refrain, accepting the
present trade law governance regime as reasonably impermeable may

mean we need more checking than balancing and not by Congress but
rather by shifting down and out just as trade has done. As the access points
and topics have grown, so ought the checks in the system in parallel.

Short of balancing, Congress could do more to address the
transparency, accountability, and legality issues that arise in this trade law
managerialism. For example, first, Congress could intervene in the
administrative landscape to address the disparity in traditional
administrative law disciplines and trade administration. Congress could
make clear the APA's application to trade lawmaking. This approach also
has its limitations, however, such as in slowing down trade lawmaking in
ineffective ways.
A stronger discipline here may be heavier judicial review over the
procedural aspects of the trade administrative state's work. Congress
could create a larger role for courts. The courts' authority is severely
curtailed by their limited subject-matter jurisdiction, limitations on
standing, and longstanding doctrines that do not permit them to scrutinize
293 The availability of
certain trade executive authorities or processes.
judicial review might lead to the development of some guidelines that

292

More work is needed to consider both how and whether it may be possible to change

conventional ideas of administrative law to "accommodate" trade law and both how and
whether trade law might adopt more conventional administrative law processes.

of
293 See generally Patrick C. Reed, Expanding the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court
International Trade: Proposals by the Customs and International Trade Bar Association, 26
Brook. J. Int'l L. 819 (2017) (discussing the limitations on the CIT's jurisdiction); accord
Devin S. Sikes, Why Congress Should Expand the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the United
States Court of International Trade, 6 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 253, 254 (2010) ("The federal

statutes vesting the CIT with jurisdiction over international trade disputes do not account for
the evolution of international trade into new areas.").
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would provide private actors with reasonable expectations and greater
consistency. It would also clarify chains of command and could help sort
the divided trade administrative state loyalties. 2 94 The multiplicity of
statutes and statutory ambiguities can serve as constraints on robust
judicial review of the unnamed rulemaking and the monitoring that
agencies, especially USTR, do. Thus, clarifying that the APA applies
where unclear or ambiguous, removing final discretion from the President
to avoid exemption from review, and using the language of administrative

law in the delegations could go a long way to improving access to the
courts and holding agencies accountable for their trade lawmaking. But
here too, there are challenges. Above all, creating justiciable standards for
the courts to apply in this context is not an insignificant undertaking.
Second, Congress could consider greater transparency obligations.
Transparency remains a problem for USTR's managerial administration.
Despite the creation of the Transparency Officer position, information

about its internal monitoring function remains inadequate. It does not
present a complete picture of its review. Its influence is often not known.
Transparency is particularly important to holding agencies accountable

for their domestic as well as international obligations. Going forward,
creating disclosure and reason-giving requirements in the trade regulatory
review process would be a good place to start. Increased transparency
would also help promote, not obscure, political accountability.

A third move for enhancing administrative law norms in trade law
would be to put additional controls on the possibility of political agencies
initiating trade-related investigations. Modifying discretion away from

executive branch agencies generally could promote trade administration's
legitimacy, but it also could create further roadblocks to sound economic
policy choices. For example, to the extent such a move strengthened the

hand of powerful interest groups, additional processes would need to be
put in place for reviewing their requests for action and evaluating their
merits.
Fourth, creating a greater role for the ITC, an independent agency, and
particularly taking away final authority from the President and passing it

to the ITC could help channel outcomes while maintaining flexibility. At
different points in the ITC's varied history, it had greater and lesser

control over its recommendations. With respect to trade remedies, it may
29

Galbraith, supra note 184, at 1693 (noting that the executive branch agencies'
loyalty is

"divided").
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be at a high point at present, but there is certainly potential for more.
Congress could require the ITC's engagement on trade lawmaking at
more stages.

Finally, given the tradification that has occurred, it may be necessary
to disaggregate trade better in the law and reexamine executive trade
authority through trade's component parts. The Constitution distinguishes
only between tariffs and the rest of foreign commerce, but a more nuanced
picture comes to light when viewed as this project does through other
measures or frames.
To be sure, enhancing accountability and transparency by adding
procedural steps or modifying agency roles could have a negative impact

on some of the unexpected virtues of managerial trade administration
such as its coordinating or flexible features. Just as the work of CBP and
ITC largely fall outside USTR's umbrella and make the system more
susceptible to inconsistencies, some of the reforms suggested above could
have similar damaging effect. Nevertheless, the many costs to the trade
system that cut against its legitimacy and reliability from the current
model could at least be partly alleviated with low impact on coordination
and flexibility if done in the right way. Minimizing structural disruptions
and focusing instead on procedural adjustments that reflect administrative
law norms ought to be at least under consideration.
Unfortunately, few of the legislative proposals on the table as of
December 2020 take up the implementation of traditional administrative
disciplines. 295 Unsurprisingly, most remain focused on enhancing the
congressional role in trade lawmaking. This project illustrates how even

though Congress, courts, agencies, and the President all regularly engage
in trade lawmaking, we lack an account of how trade's tasks ought to be
allocated among these actors and we regularly overlook the foremost
applications of agency delegation that dominate the trade landscape.
These proposals should be revisited to reflect the way trade lawmaking
occurs in actual practice. Trade's unique position at the intersection of

domestic and international and at the intersection of legislative and
executive authority has obscured this work. Finding the constitutionally
and practically appropriate administrative law disciplines will remain a
work in progress.

295 For an overview of these proposals, see Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress

Reconsiders Its Role, Lawfare (Aug. 5, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-war-battles-congress-reconsiders-its-role [https://perma.cc/D5R2-T8HP].
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CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the understudied functional administrative
governance structure in U.S. trade law with major implications for the
U.S. and global economies as well as for administrative law disciplines
and our constitutional-law-premised ideas of separation of powers.
Managerial trade administration may entail certain benefits-coherence
in trade policy, coordination among disparate agencies, flexibility in
policy making, and above all enhancing U.S. commitments to

international trade law. But, as a means to make U.S. trade law, modern
trade administration has significant downsides. It is not subject to clear
and robust checks and balances at either the congressional or
administrative level. Trade agency action is subject only to limited
judicial review just some of the time.

Ultimately, the entrenchment of the trade administrative state may
mean that reorganization is no longer feasible or desirable, but some
additional administrative law constraints could improve outcomes and
impressions. At the very least, twenty-first-century economic pressures
and a commitment to rule-of-law principles demand a renewed look at
trade administration.
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